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NATIONAL SECURITY RULES: AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION OF LAW AND WAR 
Kyle L. Greene* 
ABSTRACT 
Contemporary debates over the appropriate allocation of war powers between 
the political branches overemphasize the rigidity of the Constitution’s framework.  
This style of academic discussion sacrifices the lessons of practice in search of 
steadfast, yet empty, principles.  Even beyond the practical failings of this approach, 
there is no constitutional basis for the notion that either Congress or the President 
has a singular, fixed role when dealing with national security issues.  
In fact, the Founders developed a constitutional structure capable of continually 
reshaping—within parameters—the government’s division of national security 
power to match the nation’s security challenges.  Rather than scouring the 
constitutional text and the historical record for a concrete legal dictate on 
congressional or presidential supremacy, we should instead look to text, history, and 
structure for guidance on how the political branches can legitimately and 
affirmatively negotiate their emergent responsibilities.  
This Article does exactly that, beginning with the capacious and forward-
looking text of the Constitution and then analyzing actions taken by the political 
branches during the early years of the nation, the Civil War, and the mid-20th 
century.  No easy answers appear, but certain consistent rules and best practices 
emerge that demonstrate the Constitution’s power to cohere American law and 
strategy.  That is, as long as our elected leaders are up to the task. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ense petit placidam sub libertate quietem.1 
 
The founding generation had just finished fighting a war when they ordained 
and established our new nation’s Constitution, and war was never far from the minds 
of the men who wrote that enduring and generative text.  Accordingly, the 
Constitution enacted a cohesive geostrategy grounded in the preservation of:  (1) 
geographically isolated political union to defend American liberty from foreign 
threats, and (2) a hybrid federal-state military under the control of civilian leadership 
to preserve that liberty from domestic despotism.2  Yet the Constitution also endorsed 
a flexible legal order that could effectively carry out American geostrategy going 
                                                                                                     
* J.D., Columbia Law School, 2020; B.A., University of Massachusetts, 2016.  Thank you to the many 
people who have helped me to think more carefully and clearly about the law.  For this Article, I owe a 
particular debt to the excellent teaching and scholarship of Akhil Amar and Matthew Waxman, and to 
the invaluable writing of Philip Bobbitt. 
 1.  “[This hand] seeks with the sword a quiet peace under liberty.”  The History of the Arms and 
Great Seal of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SEC’Y OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., https:// 
www.sec.state.ma.us/pre/presea/sealhis.htm [https://perma.cc/R2UM-BE6V] (last visited Apr. 12, 
2021).  
 2.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 44-51 (2005). 
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forward.  The Constitution divides national security powers between the political 
branches according, approximately, to each branch’s comparative advantage over the 
other, but it provides no rigid, textual algorithm to decide just how far those powers 
reach or what to do when they overlap.  Therefore, the Founders—although 
particular about the appropriate geostrategic framework for their day—did not set 
down so ironclad a set of legal rules and restrictions that future protectors of the 
nation and Constitution would be unable to adapt to changed strategic realities. 
The Founders’ geostrategic plan faced intense pressures during the early 
decades of the nation’s existence, but the basic premises of their national security 
strategy—and the key elements of the accordant legal order established by the 
Constitution—proved solid.  However, as the Founders expected, America’s 
geostrategic position has evolved in dramatic ways throughout the long years from 
1788 until today.  As the decades turned into centuries, looming threats to the 
domestic security of the American people have become increasingly varied and 
catastrophic.3  At the same time, America’s national interests have become 
increasingly global and complex.4  It would have been impossible to meet these 
substantial challenges to American national security with the exact constitutional 
order of the late 1700s, and, thankfully, the nation’s strategy and law have both been 
characterized by growth rather than stasis. 
Over time, therefore, the rough division of responsibilities between the President 
and the Congress has been continually reforged in response to the external 
impositions of shifting threats and sudden catastrophes.  These events often spur the 
President to act in forceful and novel ways, but nonetheless to act with an eye toward 
the many congressional and judicial counterweights that ensure a continued 
equilibrium of security and democracy under the Constitution.5  This dynamic—
occurring primarily between the political branches and constrained by text and 
structure—is a constitutional process of national security calibration that 
legitimately incorporates geostrategic avulsion into an evolving legal order.  It 
reflects the Founders’ careful coordination of Revolutionary War-era geostrategy 
with constitutional law and their decision to provide a versatile, adaptable legal 
structure capable of recreating such calibrated coordination in the future.6  And it has 
                                                                                                     
 3.  PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 86 
(2008) (“New strategic threats are arising owing to the proliferation of WMD and long-range delivery 
systems that make every state, whether it has nearby enemies or not, and whether its borders are 
otherwise secure, vulnerable. . . .”).  Bobbitt points out additional threats to civilians, including cyber, 
biological, and radiological weapons.  Id. at 99. 
 4.  See, e.g., ANDREW KENT & JULIA DAVIS MORTENSON, THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 283 (Karen Orren & John W. Compton eds., 2018) (“Partly [the 
increase of presidential unilateralism] came in response to massively increasing stakes and complexity 
of modern foreign policy.”). 
 5.  See DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND CONGRESS 
1776 TO ISIS 426 (2016) (“[P]residents have time and time again recognized the danger . . . that inheres 
in the idea that decisions about the conduct of war are theirs alone to make. And so they have struggled 
to find ways to conduct war that have not depended on the view that they possess uncheckable war time 
powers.”). 
 6.  Or as another graduate of Columbia Law School put it: 
It has been said that the [C]onstitution marches.  That is, there are constantly new 
applications of unchanged powers, and it is ascertained that in novel and complex 
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limits.7  If either the President or Congress deviate too far from good-faith 
participation in the process, then the other political branch can choose to abandon its 
own collaborative posture by invoking core constitutional war powers, petitioning 
the courts for assistance, or turning to the electoral check of public opprobrium.  
Even if this iterative process sounds plausible as a conceptual description of how 
constitutional national security has evolved, actionable insights only emerge from a 
more careful examination of American history.  One must, therefore, analyze how 
specific episodes of national security stress have driven the process of constitutional 
calibration forward.  The entire breadth of that story is well beyond the scope of a 
single article.  Instead, this Article makes an incremental contribution to our 
collective knowledge by analyzing key events and ideas from three influential 
periods:  early America, the Civil War, and the post-World War II 20th century.   
Each of these periods posed momentous national security problems, and this 
Article looks at what happened—to America and to the Constitution—during each.  
I argue that, apart from the continued relevance and application of a few core powers, 
the efficacy of national security law has been maintained and renewed through 
presidential and congressional participation in an interbranch constitutional process 
that attempts to match the strategic context of the moment with a corresponding 
division of national security powers and responsibilities.8  Although my focus 
necessarily involves discussing the normative valence of specific actions, the point 
is not to take a red pen to history and grade how America handled each event that I 
come across.  The point is to sharpen our understanding of the process that has, in 
practice, guided the political branches as they cohered war, security, law, and the 
Constitution throughout American history. 
In Part II, I engage closely with the text of the Constitution and sketch out the 
Founders’ original vision of geostrategy and national security.  In Part III, I highlight 
early moments in American history that challenged and reinforced this picture, and 
I caution against drawing anachronistic lessons about presidential or congressional 
predominance from this period.  In Part IV, I delve into the complex and fraught 
issues of the Civil War and describe how it led to the first tectonic changes in the 
process of constitutional calibration, creating constitutional upheavals that continue 
to shape today’s national security landscape.  In Part V, I take up events following 
World War II and analyze how the obligations and options associated with America’s 
                                                                                                     
situations, the old grants contain, in their general words and true significance, needed and 
adequate authority.  So, also, we have a fighting [C]onstitution. 
Charles E. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, 2 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 18 (1917) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 7.  Although I admit that a statement like “[w]hen national emergencies strike, the executive acts, 
Congress acquiesces, and courts defer” might sketch a rough outline of the constitutional process, such 
an account fails to reflect the many law-sensitive considerations each participant carefully engages with.  
Posner and Vermeule, the quoted authors, downplay legality in favor of “rationality.”  ERIC A. POSNER 
& ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 3-5 (2007).  
But our constitutional system deserves, and demands, much more than mere contingent rationality. 
 8.  With this approach, I hope to strike a path around the war powers debate that is typically 
traveled by more committed pro-Congress or pro-Executive scholars.  That debate has so far proved 
interminable, which one should expect when the resolution up for debate—“To which branch did the 
Constitution ultimately assign the predominant role in war?”—is one that the Constitution, wisely, gave 
no answer to. 
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status as a global superpower have strained the traditional framework of 
constitutional national security.  Finally, in Part VI, I conclude the Article with some 
reflections and discuss whether modern political and strategic developments have 
finally overwhelmed the ability of this constitutional process to effectively update 
the nation’s legal order.   
II. CONSTITUTIONAL GEOSTRATEGY AND COMPLEMENTARY GOVERNMENT POWERS 
America is subject to a considerable array of paternal claims, but her midwife 
was undoubtedly war.  Naturally, the Founding Fathers were fixated on national 
security.  Many of the principal goals of the Constitution, as listed in the document’s 
vigorous Preamble, were relevant to national security9:  to “provide for the common 
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty.”10  The 
text, history, and structure of the Constitution together demonstrate that the 
Founders’ plan to secure America against external threats depended on the three 
pillars of political unity, territorial integrity, and naval force.  Fully interwoven with 
this vision of defense against foreign threats, the Founders’ Constitution 
simultaneously sought to create a military apparatus that would fulfill its defensive 
purpose without raising the specter of domestic, military tyranny.  But how to do so?  
Instead of relying on a large and powerful standing army, the Constitution vested 
Congress with the power to “raise and support Armies” with funding that could last 
“no more than two Years[,]”11 and a more open-ended power to “provide and 
maintain a Navy”12 with no term limits on appropriations.  The particular verbs and 
nouns chosen—“provide and maintain a Navy” against “raise and support Armies” 
(Armies!)—pointed to a permanent, preferred naval force and temporary, successive 
land forces.  Any resulting deficit of land troops could be met by Congress “calling 
forth the Militia”13 as needed to enforce the laws or put down rebellion.  Thus, there 
is a well-organized plan in Article I for defending the nation by using the navy—and 
calling out the state militias as a secondary resort14—rather than by depending on a 
perpetual, national land army.15  
In several of the early Federalist Papers, the strategic and structural logic behind 
the textual preference for navy over army was developed at greater length and 
directly linked to the Founders’ strong focus on national unity.  Alexander Hamilton 
and John Jay warned that disunity between the states would be a sufficient predicate 
                                                                                                     
 9.  See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 74 (1990) (“From the beginning, our Constitution has been obsessed 
with the idea of national security . . . .”); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 
27 (2012) (describing John Marshall’s analysis in McCulloch v. Maryland that “[t]he central purpose of 
the Constitution was to safeguard national security”). 
 10.  U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 11.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 12.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
 13.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 14.  See FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton) (“To render an army unnecessary [by 
maintaining a well-regulated militia], will be a more certain method of preventing its existence than a 
thousand prohibitions upon paper.”). 
 15.  See FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison) (“Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, 
the best possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a limitation of the term for which 
revenue may be appropriated to their support.”). 
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for a fearful and jealous mood to arise on the continent, inexorably leading to 
standing land armies16 and foreign alliances17 as the states sought to protect 
themselves against one another.  Powerful standing armies would, in turn, lead 
directly to a diminution of personal liberties and rights wherever those armies 
existed.18  Therefore, if the several states in America wished to avoid internecine 
conflict on the continent and the collapse of civil and political liberties within their 
borders, they would need to unite and jealously preserve the strength of their union.  
Then, the United States of America could enjoy the benefits of a navy-guarded island 
nation like Great Britain:  “An insular situation, and a powerful marine, [to guard] it 
in great measure against the possibility of foreign invasion [and] supersede the 
necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom.”19  In summary, the Founders 
thought that if America could remain a stable political union with territorial control 
over the continent, then the Atlantic Ocean and the American navy could easily 
handle any external threats without the nation needing recourse to a liberty-
threatening standing army.20  
The legal order that the Founders paired with this strategic plan divided civilian 
control over national security powers and the military between Congress and the 
President.  Congress, through the specific enumerations of Article I, was primarily 
given constitutive national security powers:  the sort of powers necessary to create, 
fund, and regulate the military.21  Some of these creative powers—to raise armies, 
maintain the navy, and nationalize the state militias in certain circumstances—were 
already discussed above.  These military-specific funding powers are a specialized 
instantiation of Congress’s greater power of the purse, often its most potent tool for 
                                                                                                     
 16.  See FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton) (“But standing armies, it may be replied, must 
inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy.  Frequent war and constant apprehension, which 
require a state of constant preparation, will infallibly produce them.”). 
 17.  See FEDERALIST NO. 5 (John Jay) (“Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more 
natural for these [independent] confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant 
nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of 
foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves.”). 
 18.  See FEDERALIST NO. 8, supra note 16 (“The violent destruction of life and property incident to 
war . . . will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions 
[standing armies] which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights.”). 
 19.  Id.; see also FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay) (“[U]nion and a good national government . . . will 
tend to repress and discourage [war].  That situation consists in the best possible state of defense . . . .”). 
 20.  George Washington would re-articulate the logic of the Federalist Papers in his farewell 
address to the nation:  “[A]ll the parts [of the country] combined cannot fail to find in the united mass of 
means and efforts greater strength, greater resource, proportionably greater security from external 
danger, [and] a less frequent interruption of their peace by foreign nations” all without the “necessity of 
those overgrown military establishments, which under any form of government are inauspicious to 
liberty, and . . . [especially] hostile to Republican Liberty . . . .”  George Washington, Washington’s 
Farewell Address (Sep. 19, 1796). 
 21.  It is worth noting that, when one moves from focusing on war to national or homeland security 
writ large, additional congressional powers also have important national security implications.  For 
instance, the interstate Commerce Clause vests Congress with broad power to regulate a vast array of 
activities with spillover effects that traverse federal or state borders.  Or, consider what the Necessary 
and Proper Clause portends for gap-filling legislative power when Congress has already been vested 
with powers to declare war and raise armies.  
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setting national policy related to security22 or other issues.23  In addition to its 
straightforwardly creative powers, Congress also has enumerated regulatory powers 
over the military—“[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval Forces”24—that afford Congress prospective, attenuated control over even 
day-to-day military structures and activities.  Finally, Congress’s most obvious 
national security power is the body’s much-debated ability to “declare War” and 
thereby commit the nation to an all-out conflict.25 
In contrast, the Constitution gave the President a set of directory national 
security powers:  the sort of powers necessary to superintend, manage, and command 
the nation’s security apparatus.  The Articles of Confederation had previously vested 
these traditionally executive powers over foreign affairs with the Continental 
Congress, but the plodding, multi-member body had been ill-suited for their 
exercise.26  The new Constitution recognized the need for a more energetic wielder 
of executive power, and thus created the office of the President to ensure that a single, 
active commander had ultimate control over the armed forces.27  Still, the President’s 
powers are less clearly defined in the Constitution’s text and so their contours—more 
dependent on structural, historical, and prudential considerations—appear both more 
expansive and more fragile than those of Congress.28   
Nonetheless, the solid text of several Article II provisions stands out.  First, no 
discussion of presidential powers can take place without noting that the President—
vested with the “executive Power”29—is broadly and ultimately responsible for 
carrying out the laws of the United States and keeping the nation running.30  Next, 
pursuant to Section I of Article II, the President must swear an oath to “faithfully 
execute the Office of President” and “preserve, protect, and defend the 
                                                                                                     
 22.  JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION 
OF POWERS 74 (2017) (“Congress has, in fact, repeatedly used its power of the purse to end, limit, or 
forestall military action.”). 
 23.  See id. at 66 (“[I]t is a mistake to think about the congressional power of the purse solely in 
terms of Congress’s power to determine spending levels.  Control over spending also provides Congress 
with significant leverage to use in negotiations over other policies . . . .”). 
 24.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 25.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.  This clause also includes the power to incorporate the civilian 
fleets of America into armed naval service through letters of marque and reprisal, which fits neatly with 
the rest of Congress’s constitutive powers and suggests that the Framers intended Congress to be able to 
commit U.S. forces to conflict short of declaring total war. 
 26.  See Saikrishna Prakash & Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 
YALE L.J. 231, 277-78 (2001). 
 27.  See FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Energy in the Executive . . . is essential to the 
protection of the community against foreign attacks . . . .”); FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(“Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those 
qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”). 
 28.  Speaking of this phenomenon at the macrolevel of the Constitution, Amar writes:  “Thanks to 
its gap and silences, Article II in effect delegated authority to the political branches to negotiate more 
concrete settlements.” AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 197. 
 29.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 30.  Barrels of ink have been spilled writing about the extent of the President’s Article II executive 
power, which contains no restrictive qualification—as do Congress’s Article I legislative powers—to 
those powers “herein granted” in the rest of the text.  I see little hope that I could advance the debate 
much by dwelling on it here, and the ideas and arguments in this Article do not depend on a particularly 
polarized view of the quantum of power granted by the Executive Vesting Clause.  
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Constitution.”31  There is a contested argument that this language grants the President 
additional, affirmative powers as necessary to fulfill the oath, but it is more plausible 
that the oath instead provides a firm ground for the President to lawfully decline to 
execute unconstitutional legislative action.32   
The language of Section II is a crucial addition to the President’s national 
security role.  It appoints the President as the “Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States [and of the State Militias when called into service,]”33 
which at least indicates the President’s authority to prosecute war by deploying 
troops and making tactical decisions during conflict,34 but says little about precisely 
when that command authority begins or ends.35  However, it can be safely stated that 
the President’s command authority is activated if Congress declares war or the nation 
suffers a sudden attack.36  Finally, in Section III, yet another provision—that the 
President “take care that the laws be faithfully executed”37—arguably gives the 
President an additional grant of broad authority to undertake whatever measures are 
needed to ensure federal laws are enforced.  But, on a more cautious reading, the 
Take Care Clause instead obligates the President to interpret and execute duly-
enacted constitutional laws on behalf of Congress and to use his available existing 
powers to overcome any barriers to that fruitful execution.38 
                                                                                                     
 31.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
 32.  See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 178-80 (describing that presidential 
fidelity to the oath and the Constitution could lead the President to properly decline to execute an 
unlawful statute); Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Laws, 18 Op. O.L.C. 
199, 200 (1994). 
 33.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 34.  The Commander in Chief power, juxtaposed against the congressional power to “declare war,” 
is often described as the power to “make war.”  See, e.g., DARREN WHEELER, CONGRESS AND THE WAR 
ON TERROR: MAKING POLICY FOR THE LONG WAR 5 (2018) (“[The Commander in Chief power] can, at 
a minimum, be safely described as the ability to make war.”). 
 35.  The decision to vest the tactical power to “make war” with the executive rather than the 
legislative branch was a conscious amendment, proposed by James Madison and Elbridge Gerry, to 
earlier drafts of the Constitution.  The Framers wanted to ensure that the nation could act with the speed 
necessary to repel a sudden attack.  Yet it was just as conscious a decision to leave the power to “declare 
war” with Congress.  See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 6-7 (1995). 
 36.  There is no doubt that the President can unilaterally spring into action when the nation is 
attacked.  AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 188 (“The power to direct America’s 
professional troops entailed, at a minimum, authority to deploy these men to repel sudden invasions, 
even in the absence of prior legislative authorization.”).  I would add to this only that there is at least 
some form of authorization for even this fundamental form of defensive action—the existence of 
professional troops to deploy.  See also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“[The United States] shall protect each 
of [the States] against Invasion.”).  The Article IV protective obligation that the United States owes to 
the states is a clear indication that the President and military might be constitutionally required to 
respond to attacks even without congressional pre-approval.  Still, one should not exaggerate the scope 
of implied presidential emergency powers by overinterpreting how energetic the office was meant to be 
or how far the executive power and Take Care Clause reach.  After all, while “inherent” emergency 
powers can undoubtedly be located in constitutional design, history, practice, etc., such powers are not 
defined expansively—or expressly at all—in the text.  
 37.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 38.  This is a stronger reading of the clause and has essentially the inverse import of the Oath of 
Office.  Where the oath permits the President not to execute unconstitutional laws, the Take Care Clause 
requires the President to execute constitutional laws.  At times, this might require assertive, even 
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Armed with the Founders’ geostrategic vision and the relevant text of the 
Constitution, it is possible to make some initial observations about the basic rules of 
constitutional national security.  Congress—in light of its specific constitutive 
powers of creation, appropriation, and regulation—is responsible for making 
foundational, ex ante decisions about the capabilities and structure of American 
military forces.  This authority dominates national security up until the moment when 
a conflict actually breaks out.  After the nation is embroiled in conflict—whether 
through congressional authorization or the President’s response to an attack—the 
enumerated congressional role largely subsides to the borders of the regulations it 
had previously passed, whatever ongoing appropriations decisions it has to make, 
and any lawful proscriptions that it can still impose.  Meanwhile, the President—in 
light of his general directory powers of superintendence, management, and 
command—has only a restrained role to play during peacetime.  But when the nation 
is engaged in conflict, the President, now fully engaged in the office of Commander 
in Chief, obtains broad discretion to prosecute the conflict as he sees fit—as long as 
he continues to act in the interest of the nation and its laws.   
There is a great deal of clarity in this textual scheme.  In practice, however, these 
powers do not operate in such sharp isolation from one another, and the President 
and Congress typically have reverberating opportunities to coordinate with and 
respond to one another.  Still, the President appears likely to possess an advantage in 
decisiveness and finality.  Congress, although in charge of forging additional 
national security capabilities for the President to use, has difficulty controlling their 
use once finished.  When it comes to the use of those capabilities, the President often 
moves first—reacting to any sudden attacks and emergencies—and always moves 
last—deciding if, when, and how to actually make use of the options that Congress 
develops.39  
However, this analysis does not mean that the President enjoys unchecked power 
to act in the name of national security or that the President will prevail in every 
dispute with Congress (or the courts).40  Even if the relative structure of the 
Constitution creates a more assertive and active executive than it does a legislature, 
it remains certain that the President has “no legal source of authority except those 
                                                                                                     
unilateral, actions on behalf of the federal government, but whatever the President does must still stem 
from a legitimate, constitutional basis. 
 39.  Cf. Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility: 
Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1390 (1994).  Bobbitt 
writes that “[a]s a structural matter, Congress has the first and last word.  It must provide forces before 
the President can commence hostilities, and it can remove those forces, by decommissioning them or by 
forbidding their use in pursuit of a particular policy at any time.”  Id. at 1391.  But Bobbitt continues, 
“once Congress has provided such forces, however, they are the President’s to command so long as they 
are used to enforce the laws and treaties of the United States . . . the President may validly commit U.S. 
forces without further returning to Congress for fresh mandates beyond those given by statutes.”  Id. at 
1391-92. 
 40.  Academic separation of powers analysis often reasons from textual powers—with some 
carefully selected originalist gloss—right to a discussion of whether Congress or the President should 
have the upper hand in a direct, interbranch conflict.  But, as this Article describes, the structure, the 
historical practice, and the strategic practicalities of implementing the Constitution are more often the 
determinative factors.  See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TARGETING AMERICANS: THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S. DRONE WAR 32 (2016) (discussing that text, while incontestable, 
provides no definitive rubric for every constitutional decision). 
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created by and within the constitutional system.”41  Thus, while the President can use 
the office’s constitutional and statutory authority for many and various ends, he must 
always plausibly identify the authority supporting his actions and publicly defend 
the legality and wisdom of the chosen course.  
In the long-run, only this forthright behavior will ensure that Congress—and the 
public—continue to preserve and provide security capabilities for the President to 
use.  The most contentious and difficult questions for the nation’s legal order arise, 
therefore, when the factual predicates of the Constitution’s geostrategic plan cease 
to apply but Congress has not yet corrected the resulting fracture between world and 
law.  Then, the political branches must scramble to align strategy with legality, and 
the potential for discord between Congress and the President is most pronounced.42  
It is in these instances—increasing in urgency and discordance over time—that the 
process of constitutional calibration is fully tested and critically important. 
III. EARLY AMERICAN PRACTICE 
The nation’s early history is littered with illustrative events that provide insight 
into the Founders’ geostrategic and constitutional vision.43  Due to the individuals 
involved in these events, and their nearness in time to the ratification of the 
Constitution, these occasions elucidate the implicit rationale and structure embedded 
in the text of the Constitution.  The presidential practice of the era is particularly 
informative.  This Article considers three examples:  (1) George Washington and the 
Whiskey Rebellion, (2) John Adams and the Quasi-War with France, and (3) Thomas 
Jefferson and the nation’s first conflict with the Barbary pirates.  If there is a theme 
that captures this era, it is that the process of constitutional calibration led to a 
national security practice that satisfied congressional constraints and amplified 
presidential powers.  While the nation’s early presidents were careful to respect their 
constitutional obligations to act lawfully and defer to the exercise of congressional 
authority, they nonetheless consistently emerged as the dominant force in national 
security decision-making.44  
A. George Washington and the Whiskey Rebellion 
George Washington’s response to the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 is a textbook 
exemplar of the political branches using the flexibility of the Constitution to 
reallocate national security power from the legislature to the executive branch.   
After Congress passed an excise tax on distilled whiskey in 1791, a small 
rebellion began to ferment in western Pennsylvania. Soon enough, farmers began to 
                                                                                                     
 41.  Id. at 47-48. 
 42.  “Is this kind of system sufficient?” is an alluring but unhelpful question.  One might wish that a 
nation of laws could establish an ex ante˗certified legal response for each potential state of the world.  
But if we exhausted every ream of paper on the planet, we would still have failed to extend the reach of 
our function to next Wednesday.  Perhaps an artificial intelligence with extraordinary superhuman 
powers will one day be capable of the task.  Until then, our nation of laws will depend on sound 
judgment and forthright justification, as it always has. 
 43.  See KOH, supra note 9, at 77 (arguing that despite America’s geographic separation from 
European powers in the early years of the Republic, “foreign sovereigns inevitably began to breach the 
cordon sanitaire” and “it quickly became apparent that the Congress was poorly structured to respond”). 
 44.  Id. at 77-81. 
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violently resist tax collectors and other federal agents.45  Although the resistance was 
limited, the federal government worried that it might take root and spread to nearby 
rural areas.46  Washington employed a light touch with the insurgents for several 
years, but he began to take a more aggressive approach in 1794.  Relying on the 
Calling Forth Act of 1792—which allowed the President to call out the militia of the 
several states to enforce the federal laws when resistance consisted of “combinations 
too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings”47—
Washington brought out militiamen from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia, and 
Maryland to suppress the rebels.48  Recall that Article I of the Constitution gives 
Congress the power to call forth the militia;49 thus, the Calling Forth Act of 1792 
was a notably quick delegation of this authority to the President.  Washington, acting 
faithfully to the other branches in return, obtained judicial approval before calling 
forth the militia and sought legislative reauthorization for the militia deployment 
when Congress was back in session in full compliance with the requirements of 
Section 2 of the Act.50   
Following the Whiskey Rebellion, Congress reenacted the time-limited 1792 
Calling Forth Act as the 1795 Militia Act.  The 1795 revisions to the original Act 
made the delegation permanent and removed the requirement that the President first 
obtain judicial approval before calling forth the militia, leaving the decision of 
whether there was a qualifying situation to the discretion of the President.51  This 
interactive series—congressional delegation to the President, followed by 
presidential adherence to statutory limits,52 and then even further delegation to the 
President—is a powerful display of the political branches jointly developing legal 
innovations that better address security concerns and strategic needs.  
B. John Adams and the Quasi-War 
The actions taken by John Adams and Congress during the 1798 Quasi-War 
represent another interesting set of back-and-forth constitutional maneuvers.  
                                                                                                     
 45.  FISHER, supra note 35, at 16-17. 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, 264 (expired 1794).  
 48.  Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149, 161 
(2004). 
 49.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 50.  Vladeck, supra note 48, at 160-61. 
 51.  Id. at 162.  Additionally, the 1795 Act removed the requirement that the President only call out 
militias from states other than the location of the resistance when Congress was not in session, and it 
removed the requirement that the President publish a proclamation that he intended to call out the militia 
prior to actually doing so.  Id.; see Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 424, 424 (repealed and 
superseded by statute in 1903). 
 52.  In one respect, however, Washington did act without receiving express congressional approval.  
Given that Washington called forth the militia and brought it into the field with Congress out of session, 
there was no funding allocated for that specific mission. Thus, Washington used funds that had been 
appropriated for the army instead.  Washington immediately reported this to Congress upon the militia’s 
return, and Congress commended him and granted the necessary appropriations.  Richard D. Rosen, 
Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the 
Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 104 (1998).  This particular interaction between the President and Congress 
is an early and important precedent for the type of actions that Lincoln would take at the outset of the 
Civil War.  
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Tensions flared between America and revolutionary France after the United States 
took up a friendlier posture toward Great Britain with the Neutrality Proclamation 
and 1794 Jay Treaty.  French naval forces soon began to attack and seize American 
ships engaged in trade with Britain, and the old Franco-American friendship rapidly 
deteriorated.53  Adams, lacking a sufficient naval force to defend against the French 
and fearful of further escalation, turned to Congress and asked the legislature to 
provide him with the forces necessary to meet this aggression.54  Pro-French 
Republicans in Congress initially resisted the military buildup and pressured the 
Adams administration to release the contents of its private negotiations with France, 
but those papers—many of them penned by future Chief Justice John Marshall—
revealed the arrogance of the French negotiators and incited public passions in the 
direction of war.55   
Over the course of the next few years, Congress—without ever declaring war—
authorized John Adams to raise additional military units, purchase additional 
gunships, set up the Department of the Navy, and respond to the escalating problem 
with the French.56  But Congress was wary of ceding too much control to the 
President.  The statutes included specific terms to limit the scope of the conflict, 
proscribing the newly-created naval forces from use except in “particular sorts of 
actions against French vessels, in particular locations, for particular purposes.”57 
Two interpretations of the Quasi-War with France—relying on similar substance 
but contrasting in their focus—are often offered.  One emphasizes that Congress 
never declared a war, but John Adams nevertheless prosecuted one.58  The second 
emphasizes that Congress passed several statutes initiating and limiting the scope of 
war, limits that Adams and the courts deferred to.59  At this point, there is no 
necessary tension between the two factually accurate descriptions.  But they quickly 
begin to diverge.  The Quasi-War, given an adversarial framing by modern 
academics, turns into a study of which of the political branches has relatively more 
                                                                                                     
 53.  GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 
239 (David M. Kennedy ed., 2009). 
 54.  Id. at 240 (“President Adams called a special session of Congress . . . [and] urged a buildup of 
American military forces, especially the navy.”). 
 55.  See JOEL RICHARD PAUL, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: JOHN MARSHALL AND HIS TIMES 169-81 
(2018). 
 56.  See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: A 
Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 964-67 (2008).  At times during the Quasi-War, 
Congress—especially Federalists in Adams’s own party—took an even more aggressive stance toward 
France than the President himself.  See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power 
to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV 695, 749-52 (1997). 
 57.  Barron & Lederman, supra note 56, at 967. 
 58.  See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of 
War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 292 (1996) (“The Quasi-War further supports the conclusion that a 
declaration of war was not understood as necessary for authorizing combat. . . . Not seeking a 
declaration was a deliberate decision of President John Adams . . . . As we have seen, the Framers left 
the crucial decisions in war to the President . . . .”). 
 59.  See FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 35, at 17-18 (“Much has been made of the 
President’s authority to engage the country in undeclared wars, such as the “quasi-war” with France . . . 
but the reference to the war in France is clearly false.  Congress debated the prospect of war openly and 
enacted a number of bills to put the country on a war footing. . . . In authorizing war, Congress may 
place limits on what Presidents may and may not do.”). 
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potent constitutional powers to dictate the contours of war.  Either affirmative answer 
ends up unhelpfully heavy-handed.60  The precedent of the Quasi-War is better 
understood by beginning with a more prosaic question about what actually took 
place:  Did Congress and the President exercise their powers counter to each other 
until one branch won out over the other, or did the two branches reach a cooperative 
posture and develop a robust and lawful national response? 
As discussed previously, Congress’s main powers are constitutive.  Meanwhile, 
the nation’s 1798 military apparatus was meager.  Thus, the statutes passed by 
Congress—although imposing legal limits—were substantial affordances of 
practical power to President Adams.61  One might call this a show of congressional 
preeminence, but Congress was able to impose legal limits on Adams only in concert 
with the clearly constitutive, pro-executive decision to create the military that Adams 
had requested.  Or one might call it a show of presidential preeminence, but the 
President’s newfound de facto command over military forces was dependent on a 
specific, demanding exercise of congressional constitutive powers.  So, a more even-
handed synthesis:  the Quasi-War did not subtly reveal which branch has the 
predominant constitutional powers.  Instead, it showed the legislature and executive 
exercising their relative competencies:  Congress creating and the President 
commanding.   
Beyond that, the Quasi-War shows how the exercise of those competencies is 
affected by context.  If the object of command is only available to the President when 
Congress first creates bespoke forces, then we can expect that congressional 
influence on the range of command choices available to the President will be 
heightened.  Furthermore, the Quasi-War demonstrated the vitality of the 
constitutional process that was implicit in the text and fast becoming explicit through 
practice.  The President recognized an emerging threat to the nation, Congress and 
the public agreed that the President needed more options to meet that threat, and so 
Congress cautiously created additional military forces for the President to 
command.62   
The President, in good faith, made use of those capabilities and respected their 
limits.63  The Quasi-War evinces that, from the start, the Constitution has encouraged 
the executive and legislative branches to be active participants in a collaborative 
process of national security calibration rather than locked in a constitutional 
wrestling match.64  We should not overemphasize the partisan aspects of the Quasi-
                                                                                                     
 60.  Especially those who describe the Quasi-War in unflinchingly pro-Congress terms.  See, e.g., 
Louis Fisher, Basic Principles of the War Power, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 319, 329 (2012) (“The 
Quasi-War of 1798 underscored the primary authority of Congress over war.”).  Contrary to Fisher, I 
believe the Quasi-War underscores the primary authority of Congress over a particular aspect of war—
creating and funding military forces. 
 61.  See generally BARRON, supra note 5, at 41-53. Barron writes that Congress originally kept firm 
ownership over its “right to declare war” by “simply refus[ing] to create a military.”  Id. at 43.  Congress 
realized, and worried, that granting Adams’s request for a “large-scale military establishment” to contest 
the French would give him the ability to choose war “in practice if not in law.”  Id. at 44. 
 62.  Id. at 52-53 (“Together, the new laws created an intricate legal framework of power but also 
constraint.”). 
 63.  Id. at 53 (“Adams and his men did their best to navigate the legal maze.”). 
 64.  This collaborative spirit is visible even after the courts were called in.  The judiciary had its 
first moment in the national security sun during the Quasi-War, and it approved of both the nation’s 
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War response in order to draw ill-fitting conclusions about relative constitutional 
supremacy and ‘settle’ the score of modern debates. 
C. Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates 
A third, and for present purposes final, case study of early national security 
practice features the nation’s third president.  Thomas Jefferson was a distinct 
constitutional interpreter.  His approach to the Constitution was avowedly historical65 
rather than textual, in contrast with Justice Story.66  And Jefferson was interested in 
individual clauses rather than overall structure, in contrast with Justice Marshall.67  
Jefferson’s constitutional approach, in sum, purported to care more about what 
particular words meant and much less about what the whole of the text did.  Further, 
Jefferson, writing to his friend and ally James Madison in 1789, praised the new 
Constitution for its “effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of 
letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body.”68  So, out of all our 
Founding Father presidents, one would most expect Jefferson to recoil from 
participation in an interbranch “constitutional process” that went beyond the simple, 
stable powers he understood to exist in the original document.  
But Jefferson, as President, was not quite so austere a Commander in Chief.  
Pirates from the Barbary States of North Africa—Tunis, Tripoli, Morocco, and 
Algiers—had long plagued the commercial conduct of merchants in the 
Mediterranean Sea.69  In the period before Jefferson came into office, the policy of 
the United States had been to pay tribute to these nation-state pirates (privateers) in 
                                                                                                     
capacity to wage war without declaring war and Congress’s power to define the scope of such a war.  In 
the leading case of Little v. Barreme, the Court held an American naval captain liable for damages for 
following an executive branch order to attack ships going to or from French ports in contravention of 
Congress’s authorization to attack ships only going to French ports.  6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).  But 
Congress, in keeping with the collaborative spirit of the Quasi-War, responded to this decision by 
passing a statute that indemnified Captain Little for his misdeeds. 
 65.  Specifically, Jefferson’s approach to the Constitution was historical in the sense of the 
constitutional modalities.  PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 
(1982) (“Historical argument is argument that marshals the intent of the draftsmen of the Constitution 
and the people who adopted the Constitution.”).  Many associate this mode of analysis with originalism.  
Then, Jefferson is the original originalist.  
 66.  JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 407, n.8 
(1833) (“[Jefferson’s] second canon is, ‘On every question of construction [we should] carry ourselves 
back to the time, when the constitution was adopted; recollect the spirit manifested in the debates; and 
instead of trying, what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, conform to the 
probable one, in which it was passed.’  Now, who does not see the utter looseness, and incoherence of 
this canon.  How are we to know, what was thought of particular clauses of the constitution at the time 
of its adoption? . . . The people adopted the constitution according to the words of the text in their 
reasonable interpretation, and not according to the private interpretation of any particular men.”) 
 67.  See AMAR, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 22-31 (describing Marshall’s 
“trademark brand of holistic analysis” exemplified by his decision in McCulloch v. Maryland); POWELL, 
supra note 40, at 26-31 (“In addressing [McCulloch v. Maryland], Jefferson presupposed that the answer 
could only be found through a clause-by-clause examination.”). 
 68.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 392-98 (Princeton Univ., eds., 1958).  Note however, that this remark was in reference to 
Congress’s appropriations power rather than its declare war power.  Id. 
 69.  See WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 53, at 634-36. 
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exchange for the unmolested passage of its ships.70  Even when tribute demands 
ballooned to consume twenty percent of the federal budget, the Adams 
administration continued to pay rather than fight back.71   
Jefferson disapproved of this passive tact, and he assumed presidential office 
ready to switch strategies.72  In short order, the President dispatched a squadron of 
gunships across the Atlantic Ocean without obtaining specific congressional 
authorization for the mission.73  Some scholars claim that Jefferson’s actions were 
nothing more than restrained defensive measures74 and that he later had to be 
compelled by Congress to take on the pirates in a committed, aggressive fashion.75  
Yet this eagerly pro-Congress view misses the forest through the trees.  Jefferson—
an originalist with an avowedly skeptical view of the executive branch—sent 
gunships across the Atlantic to battle against North African pirates without 
congressional authorization as soon as he had the power to do so:  the power of the 
presidency.  One can certainly call this defensive, as Jefferson did in public.  But it 
was a notable innovation in defensive action that brought executive branch-initiated, 
global deployments of military force within the ambit of national defense.   
The history of political branch machinations during the conflict with the Barbary 
pirates makes almost no sense from the perspective of a modern reader searching for 
the victor in an interbranch competition.  A Republican President came to office 
dissatisfied with the Federalist administration’s policy of appeasement and sent out 
gunships without obtaining congressional authorization.  But, because the President 
was acting too defensively, Federalists in Congress soon pounced on the President’s 
reticence and forced Republicans in Congress to grant him additional powers.  It is 
as if every other word has been randomly generated.   
This bizarre political narrative returns to the realm of sensibility if the First 
Barbary War is viewed as a sequential, executive-driven response to new strategic 
developments rather than a breadcrumb indicating presidential or congressional war 
powers supremacy.  First, the two strategic developments that prompted Jefferson to 
act as he did:  (1) Congress had created a more robust standing navy during the 
Adams administration, and  (2) American economic interests now required the global 
deployment of U.S. forces in order to rebuff increasingly rapacious predators.76   
Second, Jefferson exaggerated how defensive a stance he had asked the naval 
                                                                                                     
 70.  Id. at 635-36. 
 71.  Id. at 636. 
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policy.”). 
 73.  See Alex J. Whitman, From the Shores of Tripoli to the Deserts of Iraq: Congress and the 
President in Offensive and Defensive Wars, 13 U. OF PA. J. CONST. L. 1363, 1375 (2011). 
 74.  See FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 35, at 27 (“For purely defensive 
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forces to take in a performative show of fidelity to Congress.77  Third, Congress 
responded positively to this display of restraint by expressly authorizing Jefferson to 
“fully equip, officer, man, and employ such of the armed vessels of the United States 
as may be judged requisite” and to “instruct the commanders of the respective public 
vessels aforesaid to subdue, seize, and make prize of all [Tripoli ships and assets.]”78  
This was, yet again, a delegation of Congress’s constitutional powers to the 
President.  Jefferson, just like Washington and Adams before him, accrued additional 
legal powers and military capacities to deal with a novel threat to the nation because 
he highlighted his faithful acquiescence to congressional authority.  
In total, these three early examples demonstrate several of the early features, and 
outcomes, of the Constitution’s national security order.  The political branches—
starting from their core constitutional powers and comparative advantages—
collaborated more than they clashed, and they used the flexibility afforded by the 
Constitution to augment the presidential role.  As previously summarized, the period 
was characterized by presidential practice that satisfied congressional limits and 
amplified executive power.  Congress did not rely on its power to declare war as an 
on-off switch, and the body’s most debated and crucial decisions were over whether 
it should create and fund forces.   
Congress repeatedly ceded its control over war by providing the President 
military forces to command and even by delegating its creative powers directly to 
him.  In addition, presidents took defensive actions—a broader category than simply 
repelling direct foreign attacks on the continent—without specific congressional pre-
approval or even funding.  Nonetheless, these expansions of presidential power were 
accompanied by careful adherence to exacting and specific congressional 
authorizations.  Partisans of the executive or legislative branch might be able to pull 
this or that flashy quote or example to support a broad, polarized reading of textual 
powers.  But the straightforward precedent of the era is that the logic and structure 
of the Constitution enabled, even demanded, political branch participation in a 
collaborative process focused on prudently addressing new threats—a process that 
yielded a more active executive.  
IV. THE CIVIL WAR: THE EXISTENTIAL CHALLENGE OF INSURRECTION 
The story of the Civil War is undoubtedly a story of slavery, federalism, and the 
original sins of the Constitution.  But there is also no doubt that the Civil War was 
the single greatest threat to the Founders’ national security vision in American 
history.  The security of America had been built on the foundational precept of a 
unified nation set safely apart from the rest of the world’s major powers across the 
vast Atlantic Ocean.  Yet, suddenly, there was an existential threat to America 
rampaging within its own borders.  Just as shocking, this internal threat came not 
from the overreach of a despotic military junta but from a gathering coalition of 
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rebellious states.  Thus, the syllogistic strength of the Constitution’s original 
geostrategic conclusion fell apart as the Civil War rendered its premises false.  
As the Constitution’s geostrategic plan faltered, it became apparent that a 
minimal conception of its wartime legal order—comprised of orderly and static 
distinctions between those few powers which were clearly vested with Congress or 
the President—was likewise insufficient.79  The Civil War accelerated the 
participation of the political branches in the process of recalibrating national security 
powers and firmly supplemented the minimal conception with additional legal 
tools:80  aggressive executive branch use of pre-existing legislation, the capacity for 
the President to act as a temporary agent of Congress in certain situations, and robust 
presidential emergency defense powers.  These tools are all variations of the same 
theme:  if a substantial threat apprehends the nation when Congress has not yet used 
its constitutive powers to address the threat, then it is appropriate for the President—
due to the active design of that office—to bridge the gap between those constitutive 
shortfalls and the President’s own directory powers.  Although the Civil War 
prompted vast legal developments, these developments were rooted in the 
Constitution’s text, in early American practice, and in the recognition that law and 
war must remain mutually reinforcing constitutional partners.  
Unfortunately, the story of presidential action and the Civil War begins before 
Abraham Lincoln enters the picture.  James Buchanan, in office from 1857 to 1861, 
was a notoriously ineffective Commander in Chief.  Buchanan was recklessly 
passive, and his passivity allowed the emboldened pro-slavery South to gather 
strength throughout his term.   
Buchanan’s executive reticence reached an apex during the critical, feeble 
months at the end of his presidential tenure.  During this crucial time, the executive 
branch convinced itself that it was enough to simply proclaim secession illegal while 
refusing to take any actions to resist it.81  When South Carolina seceded in December 
1860, Buchanan made essentially no defense of the union and stood by as rebels laid 
siege to Fort Sumter.82  If actions were in short supply, so too were words.  The most 
forceful statement Buchanan could muster about the situation as he left office was 
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 80.  See generally JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1926).  
Randall described three archetypical positions in the Civil War era war powers debate:  (1) those who 
thought a “strict interpretation… should be adopted which would disallow many of the measures taken 
by the Government,” (2) those who thought “the Constitution is not operative during such a crisis as the 
Civil War[,]” and (3) those who thought the Constitution remained binding but “sanctions extraordinary 
powers.”  Id. at 30-31.  Randall ends this section by writing:  “[i]t would be safe to sum up the 
prevailing views of our judges by saying that the war powers are entirely consistent with the 
Constitution, and that these war powers include all that is essential to the nation’s preservation.”  Id. at 
33. 
 81.  BARRON, supra note 5, at 129 (“[Attorney General] Black and Buchanan clung to the view that 
the cautious strategy they had pursued was wise.  Secession remained illegal as a matter of official 
policy.”).  
 82.  Although Buchanan—under threat of an exodus of pro-Union members from his cabinet—
refrained from ordering Major Anderson to abandon Fort Sumter, he “refused to retaliate when a 
steamer sent to supply Anderson was turned away under fire.”  Id.at 123-27. 
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directed against the North.  Buchanan accused abolitionists of inciting slave revolts, 
and conspiracy theories that repeated the charge soon swept across the South.83  
Buchanan’s timidity and sectional partiality demonstrate the danger of a President 
who fails to react to urgent strategic developments and scrupulously denies the 
opportunities for executive vigor in our constitutional system.84  
And then came Abraham Lincoln.  By the time he took office in March of 1861, 
seven states had already purported to secede from the Union.  Lincoln, in his ringing 
First Inaugural, defended the great and perpetual nature of the United States of 
America and emphasized his duty as President to make sure that its law would be 
faithfully executed, even in the South.85  Still, Lincoln showed restraint, offering the 
gathering Confederacy a final chance to peaceably return to the beneficial embrace 
of the Union.86  But when Lincoln attempted to send provisions to the besieged 
federal troops at Fort Sumter, militiamen from South Carolina stormed the outpost 
before the provisions could arrive and forced the Union garrison to surrender.87  April 
was not yet halfway through, and the Civil War was joined.  Congress was out of 
session at the time, enjoying its customary spring recess.  Thus, the nation’s survival 
fell to Lincoln and, through a series of crucial actions, he both saved the Union and 
initiated a drastic, executive branch-centered recalibration of constitutional national 
security.88 
President Lincoln’s first move was to supplement the woefully underprepared 
U.S. military with additional fighting men.  The day after Fort Sumter fell, Lincoln 
called forth 75,000 militiamen to help suppress the secessionist states.89  His April 
15th proclamation decried the belligerence of the rebels and named their refusal to 
allow the laws of the United States to be executed a “combination[] too powerful to 
be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.”90  In the same 
proclamation, Lincoln requested that Congress meet for an emergency session on 
                                                                                                     
 83.  JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 201 (2012). 
 84.  See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 94-99 (2003) (calling the Buchanan 
administration’s analysis, which concluded that armed opposition to secession was unconstitutional, 
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acts of violence, within any State or States, against the authority of the United States, are 
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Id.  
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 87.  FARBER, supra note 84, at 116. 
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energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security.”  FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
 89.  Abraham Lincoln, A Proclamation (Calling Forth the Militia) (Apr. 15, 1861).    See also 
DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 348 
(2005). 
 90.  Id.  This is the exact language of the 1795 Militia Act, which requires the President to call forth 
the militia through such a proclamation.  Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 424, 424. 
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July 4th.91  Following Lincoln’s proclamation, Simon Cameron—the Secretary of 
War—sent out a telegram to the various state governors citing the Calling Forth Act 
of 1795 as statutory authority and asking for specific troop requisitions from each 
state.92   
Lincoln’s initial response to the outbreak of the Civil War was, therefore, a 
lawful exercise of congressionally-delegated constitutive powers.  Although not 
following the original legal order established by the Constitution, his actions did 
follow the statutory national security precedents set by George Washington and the 
1795 Congress after the Whiskey Rebellion. 
A. Abraham Lincoln’s Blockade of the South 
Only a few days after calling forth the militia, on April 19th, Lincoln took further 
action and enacted a blockade on the southern ports ranging between South Carolina 
and Texas.93  Shortly thereafter, he extended the blockade to encompass the ports of 
North Carolina and Virginia.94  At first, one might think this blockade posed no 
difficult questions about the scope of presidential initiative.  The authority to respond 
defensively to a sudden attack is at the core of the president’s allotment of 
constitutional war powers.  Furthermore, the 1807 Insurrection Act had already 
provided congressional authorization for the President to use “such part of the land 
or naval force of the United states, as shall be judged necessary” to help put down 
any insurrection that the militia had—pursuant to the 1795 Militia Act—been called 
forth to suppress.95   
But there was some difficulty.  A blockade is an act of war:  the type of military 
action typically carried out only against a foreign state as part of a full war.  Enacting 
a blockade against the secessionist states as if they were a foreign enemy, therefore, 
put pressure on Lincoln’s claim that the states remained in the Union and highlighted 
that Congress had not declared a state of war with the South.96  The legal complexity 
of the Civil War was already beginning to rear its head.  
Nonetheless, the President’s blockade of the Confederate states was soon 
approved by Congress and then upheld by the Supreme Court.  The President’s 
authority to use federal war powers in response to an attack on the United States—
even if lacking a congressional declaration of war97 and facing a novel type of 
adversary—was firmly incorporated into the constitutional order.  The 37th 
                                                                                                     
 91.  Lincoln, A Proclamation, supra note 89. 
 92.  Simon Cameron, Telegram to State Governors (Apr. 15, 1861) (“I have the honor to request 
[from your state] the quota designated in the table below, to serve as infantry or riflemen, for the period 
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 93.  WITT, supra note 83, at 145; FARBER, supra note 84, at 117. 
 94.  WITT, supra note 83, at 145.  The blockade was extended after Virginia and North Carolina, as 
well as Tennessee and Arkansas, responded to the call for militiamen by seceding and joining the 
Confederacy.  See FARBER, supra note 84, at 117. 
 95.  Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443. 
 96.  See WITT, supra note 83, at 144-49. 
 97.  As discussed earlier, the Civil War was hardly the first conflict waged without a congressional 
declaration of war.  See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, Youngstown: Pages from the Book of Disquietude, 19 
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Congress, during its special summer session, specifically authorized the President to 
stop “all commercial intercourse” between secessionists and the Union;98 further 
authorized him to seize all goods, merchandise, and vessels coming or leaving the 
Confederacy “by land or water;”99 and even authorized him to seize “any ship or 
vessel belonging in whole or in part to any citizen or inhabitant of said [secessionist] 
State[.]”100  All of these were to be enforced using any “suitable vessels” that the 
President thought appropriate for the task.101   
Congress, rather than attempting to curtail the blockade, enthusiastically 
endorsed Lincoln’s ability to take such a measure.  Near the end of the summer, 
Congress passed a further resolution that declared Lincoln’s pre-July actions 
“respecting the army and navy of the United States . . . hereby approved and in all 
respects legalized and made valid . . . as if they had been issued and done under the 
previous express authority and direction of the United States.”102  Again, we see the 
process of constitutional calibration at work.  Despite some tension between the new 
threat facing the nation and the defensive options available to the political branches, 
an assertive presidential response forcefully rebuffed the danger and was then 
affirmed by Congress. 
In this instance, however, Congress’s approval was likely superfluous as a 
constitutional matter.103  Although Congress went out of its way to bolster Lincoln’s 
authority to enact blockades going forward, Lincoln maintained that the blockade 
was “strictly legal” from the start.104  And the Supreme Court, in The Prize Cases,105 
agreed.  The Court held that, as a general matter, the President was empowered—
even duty-bound—to respond when the nation was attacked by a “hostile party” and 
thereby dragged into war.106  In this situation, the Court held that war had in fact 
been forced upon the nation by the secessionist states.107  Thus, Lincoln’s defensive 
blockade was constitutional.108   
Importantly, the Court avoided any too-clever paradoxes—such as holding that 
                                                                                                     
 98.  Act of July 13, 1861, ch. 3, § 5, 12 Stat. 255, 257. 
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Id. § 6. 
 101.  Id. § 7. 
 102.  Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 255, 326.  
 103.  See, e.g., Geoffrey Corn, Presidential War Power: Do the Courts Offer Any Answers?, 157 
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 104.  Abraham Lincoln, July 4th Message to Congress (1861). 
 105.  67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). 
 106.  Id. at 668 (“[The President] does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge 
without waiting for any special legislative authority . . . whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or 
States organized in rebellion . . . .”).  See also The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700, 702 (1871) (“[The] 
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act during the recess of Congress.”). 
 107.  The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 667 (“[The Civil War’s] actual existence is a fact in our 
domestic history which the Court is bound to notice and to know.”). 
 108.  Id. at 671 (“[T]he President had a right, jure belli, to institute a blockade of ports in possession 
of the States in rebellion . . . .”). 
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the conflict with the secessionists could not be treated as a war unless the United 
States recognized the Confederate states as a sovereign nation—that would cripple 
the Union effort and throw the Civil War into a legal grey zone with no clear laws 
for the conflict at all.109  The Court squarely held that the conflict with the southern 
states should be treated as a war for legal purposes even if the federal government 
continued to deny that those states had independent sovereignty.110  Lincoln was fully 
vindicated by the Supreme Court.  The federal government, with the executive 
branch at the tip of the spear, could reject the possibility of secession and still use 
the full gamut of war powers to defend itself.111  
President Lincoln’s aggressive decisions to call forth the militia and enact a 
blockade on Confederate ports were lawful outgrowths of the Constitution’s vision 
of an energetic, emergency-ready presidency and of early American adjustments that 
reallocated additional powers to the President by statute.  His next two steps, 
however, reflected a more ambitious assumption of presidential authority to step into 
the shoes of Congress and create additional, unfunded military forces.   
First, on April 20th, Lincoln privately authorized a trio of expenditures with no 
corresponding congressional appropriation:  naval commanders were permitted to 
purchase several steamships, the Secretary of War allowed New York state officials 
to transport troops and munitions, and the Treasury Secretary advanced two million 
dollars to private New York citizens to spend funds on necessary “military and naval 
measures.”112  Then, on May 3rd, Lincoln publicly proclaimed that “existing 
exigencies demand immediate and adequate measures for the protection of the 
[Constitution and nation.]”113  He called for 42,000 additional three-year volunteers, 
increased the army by more than 22,000 enlisted men and officers, and directed the 
enlistment of 18,000 more men into the navy.114  At the end of the proclamation, 
Lincoln wrote that these military enlargements would be “submitted to Congress as 
soon as assembled.”115  Both of Lincoln’s actions were boldly constitutive in nature, 
stepping outside the typical frame of the presidential role.  Yet they are not equal in 
other important constitutional respects.  
Crucially, President Lincoln did not disclose the April expenditures publicly 
either at the moment when he authorized them or to Congress when the 
representatives met for their special session in July.116  It was not until early in the 
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 116.  Barron & Lederman, supra note 56, at 1001-02. 
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next year that Congress became fully aware of the expenditures and the secretive 
cabinet deliberations that had preceded them.117  In April of 1862, Congress censured 
the former Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, for, among other misdeeds, his role 
in the expenditures.118  Lincoln wrote to Congress on Cameron’s behalf the next 
month and defended the necessity of what had been done, but he did not argue that 
it had been lawful:  “I believe that by these and other similar measures taken in that 
crisis, some of which were without any authority of law, the government was saved 
from overthrow.”119   
Given the circumstances, there is no avoiding the conclusion that Lincoln’s 
April expenditures were unconstitutional usurpations of congressional power and, 
rightfully, the type of presidential behavior that has not been adopted into the 
national security order.  The fundamental problem is less that the President briefly 
infringed on a congressional prerogative and more so that he did it in a decidedly 
undemocratic way.  The decisions were made during private cabinet discussions and 
then carried out through private channels that avoided congressional or public 
review.  The process of constitutional calibration cannot be activated if one political 
branch works in secret to invade the core national security powers of the other—
here, Lincoln invading Congress’s appropriations power. 
The President’s unconstitutional April expenditures can be safely contrasted 
with his May army and navy increases.  Although both acts were constitutive, the 
latter was done through a public proclamation with Congress out of session, 120 and 
Congress had an opportunity to respond soon afterwards.  In this way, Lincoln was 
acting as a temporary agent of Congress during a moment of crisis—taking up a 
traditionally legislative power until Congress could ratify or reject his course of 
action.  Still, if Congress’s approval of the blockade had been more reassuring than 
strictly necessary, its response here was a crucial determinant of what would happen 
going forward.  Congress took up the Lincoln line:  it appropriated funds to pay 
arrearages to the new members of the army,121 navy,122 and others123 for their recent 
service; funded those forces going forward;124 and provided a blanket, retroactive 
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for giving a private citizen money to purchase arms “without restriction” and entering into “a vast 
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255, 264 (for other logistical expenses). 
 122.  Act of July 18, 1861, ch. 8, § 2, 12 Stat. 255, 267 (for pay and other logistical expenses). 
 123.  Act of July 27, 1861, ch. 23, 12 Stat. 255, 279 (for “the Police organized by the United States 
for the City of Baltimore”). 
 124.  Id. § 1 (for the navy); Act of July 16, 1861, ch. 6, § 1, 12 Stat. 255, 261-64 (for the army and 
forts). 
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validation of Lincoln’s actions “respecting the army and navy of the United 
States.”125   
An observer with a strict approach to separation of powers analysis might still 
come to the conclusion that Lincoln acted unconstitutionally and then Congress gave 
him a political pass.  This Article argues otherwise.  It was apparent that presidents 
had limited constitutive powers in emergency circumstances ever since George 
Washington put down the Whiskey Rebellion without the benefit of congressional 
appropriations to do so.126  To call all presidential use of this temporary constitutive 
power unconstitutional would flatten the meaningful distinctions that exist between, 
as we have just seen, President Lincoln’s April and May actions.127  The democratic 
characteristics of those actions are a world apart, and the Constitution need not be 
made so blind as to miss that fact.128  In April, Lincoln acted secretly and improperly 
to displace Congress.  In May, he acted publicly and temporarily in the stead of 
Congress, and the body’s subsequent response allowed Lincoln’s wisely chosen 
course to continue forward.129 
B. Abraham Lincoln’s Suspension of Habeas Corpus 
Finally, no discussion touching on national security, constitutional law, and the 
Civil War can take place without considering President Lincoln’s suspension of 
habeas corpus.  In the spring of 1861, border states between the North and South 
teetered on the edge of loyalty to the Union, as seen when Virginia, North Carolina, 
and other states responded to Lincoln’s call for militiamen by themselves 
seceding.130  After Virginia seceded, Washington D.C. was nearly surrounded by 
Confederates.  The capital was tenuously connected to the rest of the Union only 
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through the border state of Maryland.131  And Maryland too was up against the sharp 
edge of secession.  Insurgent Marylander mobs attacked Union militiamen traveling 
through the state and insurgent saboteurs cut train and telegraph lines.132   
In late April, with Congress still out of session, Lincoln ordered General 
Winfield Scott to suspend the writ of habeas corpus as necessary “in the vicinity of 
any military line . . . between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington.”133  
Pursuant to this authorization, military commanders in Maryland arrested and 
detained John Merryman, a Baltimore farmer and alleged secessionist militiaman, 
without bringing any charges against him.134 
Chief Justice Taney, sitting as a circuit judge in Maryland, attempted to take up 
the case.  His opinion in Ex parte Merryman castigated Lincoln and the military after 
the commander of Fort McHenry—where Merryman was held—invoked the 
suspension of habeas corpus and refused to appear in court to produce the prisoner 
or justify his detention.135  Taney wrote that the Suspension Clause was a limit on 
the legislative power to suspend habeas corpus that instructed Congress to use 
“extreme caution” before suspending the writ,136 and that the President could 
absolutely not “in any emergency, or in any state of things, . . . authorize the 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.”137  Yet Taney made no formal order of 
release for Merryman, instead sending copies of his opinion to Washington, D.C. 
and lamenting that his judicial power was “resisted by a force too strong for me to 
overcome.”138  Lincoln did not answer Taney directly, but he did take up the issue of 
habeas corpus in his July 4th address to Congress on the first day of its special 
session.  
In his address, President Lincoln forcefully proclaimed that the suspension had 
been lawful, and that, even if not, it had been a necessary, nation-preserving choice 
in the face of constitutional conflict.139  Lincoln’s legal argument took a structural 
and prudential approach to the Constitution, layering pragmatic considerations onto 
the text.  Given that habeas corpus could be suspended in “cases of rebellion or 
invasion, [when] the public safety does require it,” and that there was such a case of 
rebellion now, the remaining question was simply whether Congress or the President 
was vested with the power to enact the suspension.140   
Lincoln answered that the provision “was plainly made for an emergency” and 
that it would be illogical if suspension must wait “until Congress could be called 
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together” when the emergency might well prevent “the very assembling” of 
Congress.141  Therefore, the President himself must have the provisional power to 
suspend habeas corpus.  In the alternative, Lincoln’s necessity argument cited the 
Take Care Clause, which might force him to weigh allowing all of the federal laws 
in the secessionist states to go unexecuted against violating the privilege of habeas 
corpus “to a very limited extent.”142  Lincoln further stated that the “official oath 
[would] be broken” if a President allowed the government to be overthrown because 
of rigid adherence to any “single law.”143  His arguments thus made, he called for a 
congressional response—inviting Congress into the process of constitutional 
calibration.144  
If one accepts—as I do—Lincoln’s primary argument that the President can 
lawfully suspend habeas corpus during an emergency that prevents Congress from 
doing so, then one should also expect this provisional authority to expire when 
Congress convenes and is able to make a decision for itself.  But what if Congress 
convenes and makes no decision?   
After its July 4th session began, Congress could have acted—right then in 
1861—to either support or supplant Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus.145  
Instead, Congress did neither.  It was nearly two years later when Congress finally 
chose to support the suspension with the 1863 Habeas Corpus Act.146  The 
intervening period between July 4, 1861 and March 3, 1863 was a breakdown in the 
process of constitutional calibration and interbranch cooperation, and Congress’s 
inaction caused a situation where Lincoln had little choice but to violate the 
Constitution.  This dovetails neatly with Lincoln’s secondary argument that the Oath 
of Office and Take Care Clause might create a constitutional conflict between 
enforcement of the many laws and strict respect for the one law.  Lincoln thought 
that it would be proper, if supra-constitutional, for the President to choose the many 
laws in that instance.147   
Given the arguments made in this Article, such a conflict is possible—but not 
inevitable—in the Constitution, which is flexible enough to bring constitutional 
legality to bear in an incredible range of extraordinary circumstances as long as the 
political branches actually participate in the national security process envisioned by 
the Constitution.  The importance of constitutional calibration through active 
interbranch participation is further emphasized by what happened when Congress 
finally did act.  Similar to many of the episodes previously discussed, eventual 
congressional authorization of the suspension of habeas corpus enabled Congress to 
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exert more control over subsequent presidential conduct.148  In other words, the 
President—and the nation—do not have the option to stand frozen on critical matters 
of national security.  Congress, therefore, must also actively exercise its robust war 
powers in order to exert a sensible effect on policy and keep constitutional law afloat.  
The Civil War and Reconstruction were the source of two great conceptual 
revolutions in the inextricably intertwined fields of rights and security.  One of these 
revolutions is well-known in law schools and legal culture.  It is the nationalist ethos 
of the Reconstruction Amendments and the full realization that—even in our 
federalist system—the most potent protector of human and civil rights is not the 
states, but the federal government and the federal Constitution.149  The second 
revolution is closely connected to the first, but of less profile.150  It is the upheaval 
of the Constitution’s national security order, an upheaval that underscored the 
security-preserving and liberty-protecting role of a decisive President who will 
bridge the gap between constitutive and directory powers when the situation 
demands it.151  That is, as long as the President acts publicly, identifies reasonable 
legal grounds for his action, and affords a willing Congress the opportunity to 
respond by using its core powers to alter the nation’s course of conduct.  This latter 
legal revolution has not been as obviously affirmed in formal constitutional 
amendments or the Supreme Court’s written decisions.  But we should not forget that 
first the Civil War was fought and won, and only then did we get the Thirteenth, 
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constructs a division between “foreign affairs” and “domestic statutory and constitutional powers” that 
takes Lincoln’s precedents out of the realm of national security.  Given what I have written about the 
constitutional tenets of American national security strategy and law—and the complex nature of the 
Civil War itself—I cannot agree that any such distinction is plausible.  For example, as the blockade 
against the secessionist states demonstrates, the methods of nation-state war and those of domestic 
security were significantly blended during the Civil War. 
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Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. 
V. THE POST-WAR 20TH CENTURY: AMERICA THE GLOBAL SUPERPOWER 
Less than eighty years after the ratification of the Constitution, the Civil War 
disrupted American geostrategy and showed the nation that there need not be a 
menacing foreign foe for the United States to confront an existential threat at home.  
Less than a hundred years after the Civil War, America emerged from World War II 
as a global superpower with far-flung geostrategic interests and novel vulnerabilities 
at home—a boisterous nation flush with new commitments and concerns.152  In this 
Part, I begin by discussing a set of three critical strategic and legal developments that 
came about shortly after the close of World War II:  (1) the growth of the U.S. 
military, (2) the commencement of the Korean War, and (3) the Youngstown 
decision.  Then, I address how the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”)—an important 
framework statute passed after the Vietnam War—fits into the constitutional process 
of national security calibration.   
The Vietnam War emphasized the extent to which Congress’s traditional 
national security role had been diminished by earlier 20th century strategic 
developments, and the WPR was the crowning statute of Congress’s effort to 
reestablish the body’s energy and relevance.153  This congressional enterprise, 
however, should not be roundly applauded until it has been examined.  Although 
Congress’s abstract aims were commendable, the WPR is rife with issues.  Overall, 
this period of American national security highlighted the difficulty of finding 
proactive, cooperative roles for the President and Congress, as well as the dangers of 
failing to do so.  In particular, the political branches struggled to deliver a coherent 
two-step solution:  (1) providing the executive branch with a flexible and potent array 
of options to bring to bear against new strategic pressures while, (2) ensuring 
assertive and impactful congressional participation in the lawful exercise of those 
options. 
A. Expansion of the U.S. Military 
The first major development in the post-war 20th century was the substantial 
increase of the size, variety, and preparedness of the peacetime U.S. military 
following the close of World War II.154  The novel phenomenon of a large, 
professional military ready to be deployed at all times undermined the key 
                                                                                                     
 152.  This intervening period of time included World War I, World War II, and a host of other 
important wars, conflicts, and national security incidents as the United States grew from regional power 
to global superpower.  Still, for the level of granularity appropriate for this Article, the course of 
constitutional national security can be charted without delving into events from 1865-1945. 
 153.  See S. REP. NO. 91-129, at 7, 7-8 (1969) (“[T]he executive has acquired virtual supremacy over 
the making as well as conduct of the foreign relations of the United States.  The principle cause has been 
[American involvement] in a series of crises which have revolutionized and are continuing to 
revolutionize the world of the 20th century.”). 
 154.  See, e.g., Robert L. Goldich, American Military Culture from Colony to Empire, 140 
DAEDALUS 58, 61-62 (2011).  And after World War II, just as millions of men flooded into the military 
and stayed there, military leaders flooded out of the military into civil government and businesses.  This 
exchange further cemented the central role of the post-World War II military in politics and society.  See 
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 355-66 (1957). 
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constitutive valve Congress had historically used to maintain preclusive control over 
military action:  the decision whether to create military forces at all.155  Presidents 
after World War II had a vast array of credible military options to command at any 
given time without, as a practical matter, needing overt congressional approval for 
the particular mission.156   
In addition, Congress, through the National Security Act of 1947, exercised its 
legislative powers to restructure America’s national security apparatus so that it 
would be subject to “authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian 
control.”157  Congress created the Central Intelligence Agency, the Air Force, and 
the National Security Council, and it brought the nation’s now-expansive military 
and intelligence infrastructure squarely under the centralized control of the executive 
branch.158  Following the passage of the 1947 Act, presidents could not only deploy 
the military widely but could also initiate a range of covert and tactical operations to 
vindicate specific national interests.   
Congress—responding to the military lessons of World War II and recognizing 
its duty to ratify complementary legal frameworks159—had purposefully provided 
these capabilities to the executive branch to ensure that laws would not be so 
“restrictive and inflexible” that they would thwart the strategic and political aims of 
the nation.160  On the other hand, however, opponents of the 1947 Act immediately 
decried the measures as an abdication of Congress’s constitutional role.161  Finally, 
in addition to traditional or covert armed forces, the invention of nuclear weapons 
further contributed to the need for and provision of greater presidential control—
                                                                                                     
 155.  For instance, as discussed earlier, the main source of congressional opposition to John Adams 
during the Quasi-War with France had been concern that expansion of the navy would undermine 
Congress’s functional control over military actions.  See BARRON, supra note 5, at 43 (“[The lack of a 
standing military] ensured that Congress retained de facto control over the commander in chief.  With 
no standing forces to command, the president had no choice but to seek permission to conduct any 
particular military operation, big or small, that he might favor.”). 
 156.  CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 74 (“[I]n many circumstances, the president’s decision whether or 
not to go to war in the first place as well as her decision about what sort of war to prosecute are made in 
light of the military she has. And, of course, what kind of military she has is a function of the sort of 
military Congress chooses to fund.”). 
 157.  National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, § 2, 61 Stat. 495, 496. 
 158.  Id. §§ 101(a), 102(a), 207(a); see also KOH, supra note 9, at 101-04 (“[T]he National Security 
Act of 1947 formalized the principle of accountable, centralized presidential management of the external 
acts of [military and intelligence] officials.”). 
 159.  H.R. REP. NO. 80-961, at 2 (1947) (“The experiences of the war just concluded have proven 
conclusively that we must maintain in time of peace an adequate organization of the national defense 
readily adapted to the needs of war on short notice. . . . Since we are a people governed by laws and not 
by men… One of the purposes of the bill is to give statutory effect to certain organizational features 
developed during the war and which have proven to be desirable. . . .”). 
 160.  Id.  
 161.  The chairman of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Clare E. 
Hoffman, appended his contrasting views to the Committee Report.  Hoffman wrote that: 
[T]he proposed legislation does not conform to the procedure for the national defense as 
outlined in the Constitution. . . . It is no answer to say these new agencies . . . must come 
[to Congress] to implement their plans. . . . It is a matter of common knowledge that all too 
often the Congress and the Nation are whipped into line, compelled to support plans and 
policies promulgated [by the executive branch] . . . . 
Id. at 7. 
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especially as the logic of nuclear deterrence matured.162  The rise of the executive 
branch in the atomic age was a conscious, cooperative reaction to new strategic 
demands and to the softening distinction between times of war and peace.163 
B. The Korean War 
America’s new balance of war powers was soon elaborated upon by Harry 
Truman.  In the spring of 1950, the Truman administration produced a strategic 
planning document, NSC 68, to govern the nation’s Cold War efforts.164  The plan 
called for a “concerted build up” of the nation’s economic, political, and particularly 
military strength so that the “moral and material strength of the free world” could be 
projected into the “Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change 
in the Soviet system.”165  War—certainly, offensive war—was not the aim of this 
plan, but NSC 68 emphasized that America had to treat “the cold war [as] in fact a 
real war” and remain prepared to make remarkable investments to defend its vital 
interests whenever necessary.166  At first, it was no certainty that Truman would 
adopt the conclusions of the report, but any doubt on the matter was resolved when 
North Korea crossed the 38th Parallel just weeks later.167  North Korean troops struck 
a surprise blow against its southern neighbor in late June of 1950, and the President 
rapidly deployed troops to defend South Korea without obtaining specific 
congressional authority.168  
The State Department, in a brief memorandum written on July 3, 1950, delivered 
the legal rationale of the Truman administration.169  In particular, the memo argued 
that North Korea’s defiance of a pair of Article 39 U.N. Security Council resolutions 
posed a threat to the “peace and security of the United States.”170  This threat created 
a national interest which the President, as Commander in Chief, could lawfully act 
to protect.171  An earlier statute that had limited the President’s domestic authority to 
deploy U.S troops pursuant to U.N. authorization was not triggered because that 
statute pertained only to military support obliged by a “special agreement” with the 
                                                                                                     
 162.  See Act of Aug. 4, 1946, ch. 724, § 6, 60 Stat. 755, 763 (“The President from time to time may 
direct the Commission (1) to deliver such quantities of fissionable materials or weapons to the armed 
forces for such use as he deems necessary in the interest of national defense . . . ”). 
 163.  See Matthew C. Waxman, The Power to Threaten War, 123 YALE L. J. 1626, 1685 (2014) 
(“[The Cold War strategy] of deterrent and coercive force . . . rested on a foundation of executive-
congressional collaboration and dialogue that played out over decades.”). 
 164.  See generally NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, NSC-68: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
COUNCIL BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR 
NATIONAL SECURITY (1950). 
 165.  Id. at 64. 
 166.  Id. at 65. 
 167.  See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 772-75 (1992). 
 168.  BARRON, supra note 5, at 296. 
 169.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DEP’T ST. BULL., PUB. NO. 3926 AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO 
REPEL THE ATTACK IN KOREA 173, 173 (1950). 
 170.  Id. at 177.  North Korean defiance first posed a threat to the U.N.’s effectiveness, and through 
that to “international peace and security,” and through that to the United States.  Id. at 176-77. 
 171.  Id. at 177-78 (arguing that the President’s deployment of troops was “within his authority as 
Commander in Chief” and providing 85 past examples of when the United States “used its land and 
naval forces in foreign territories during peacetime”). 
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U.N., and the deployment here was a voluntary decision by Truman.172  Although 
the President lacked express congressional authorization, Congress was kept abreast 
of Truman’s intentions from the start and the war had many legislative supporters.173  
The lack of any official authorization was, to a great extent, a result of international 
politics and Truman’s desire to avoid the appearance of a potential World War III 
coming so hot on the heels of World War II.174  And, even more to the point, 
Congress overwhelmingly voted to provide appropriations for the war and renewed 
selective service laws so that the draft would continue to support the war effort.175  
Nonetheless, Congress had a relatively hands-off approach to the Korean War 
compared to previous conflicts of similar scale—especially with regard to initiation 
of the conflict. 
The Korean War is yet another event supporting the proposition that major 
armed conflicts do not necessarily require a declaration of war, which at this point 
should not come as particularly surprising or troubling.176  The war does, however, 
point to the opening of a more troublesome gulf—in time and of purpose—between 
the legal acts of the President and Congress.  Both branches, relying on Congress’s 
substantial constitutive actions in the years prior to the Korean War, were willing to 
let the war effort itself rest on vigorous presidential initiative with only minimal 
contemporaneous congressional input.   
The war’s lack of active constitutional process, therefore, cannot be attributed 
to a spontaneously generated imperial presidency.  Although Truman contributed to 
an emerging shift in war powers process, his contributions were neither unprompted 
nor unilateral.177  The infirmity of deliberative interbranch activity during the Korean 
War had significant strategic and structural causes, and so any remedy would need 
to be something more creative and practical than an undifferentiated call for greater 
external constraints on the President. 
C. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 
The Supreme Court did not have to grapple directly with any constitutional 
questions about the initiation of the Korean War, but in 1952 the Court was tasked 
                                                                                                     
 172.  See Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology 
Matters, 106 YALE L. J. 845, 868-69 n.125 (1996). 
 173.  See Barron & Lederman, supra note 56, at 1059 (“When Truman made his unilateral moves in 
Korea in 1950, there was little opposition in Congress because the legislature largely favored what he 
had done.”); MCCULLOUGH, supra note 167, at 781 (“In the Senate, Republican William Knowland 
called for ‘overwhelming support’ for the President from all Americans regardless of party.”). 
 174.  See BARRON, supra note 5, at 298. 
 175.  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2060 n.43 (2005); MCCULLOUGH, supra note 167, at 781 (“By a 
vote of 315 to 4, the House promptly voted a one-year extension of the draft law.”). 
 176.  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 175, at 2050 (“[M]ost uses of military force in U.S. history, 
including significant military engagements such as the Korean War and the Kosovo bombing campaign, 
have been initiated without express congressional authorization.”). 
 177.  After all, Congress’s defense spending spree continued, with defense spending growing from 
~2% of GDP in the years prior to World War II, to ~ 8% of GDP in the early post-war Truman 
administration, and then to nearly 15% by the end of the Truman administration.  Defense Spending 
Charts, U.S. GOV’T SPENDING, https://www.usgovernmentspending.com/defense_spending_analysis 
[https://perma.cc/ES4W-UVKM] (last visited Apr. 12, 2021). 
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with deciding an important domestic case that implicated the wartime division of 
political branch powers.  That case, of course, is now the favorite child of many a 
constitutional or national security law casebook:  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer.178   
Youngstown, often called the “Steel Seizure Case,” concerned President 
Truman’s seizure of steel mills to keep them running after long-simmering labor 
disputes boiled over into a national strike during the Korean War.179  Truman acted 
through an Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to take over the 
steel mills, but he twice wrote to Congress asking for it to affirm or reject his 
action.180  Congress made no response.181  In the end, the Supreme Court held 6-3 
for the mill owners against the President, with each Justice in the majority writing 
his own opinion.  
The many opinions in Youngstown exhibit a range of constitutional 
methodologies.182  Of these, Justice Robert Jackson’s sophisticated structural 
approach to analyzing the constitutional validity of presidential action has garnered 
the most attention.  Jackson’s description of the extent of executive power is a 
nuanced and outstanding piece of constitutional analysis, and this Article often 
follows—at least attempts to follow—in the footsteps of Justice Jackson.183   
Although Jackson’s Youngstown framework is typically described as 
tripartite,184 the framework actually depends on two distinct, substantive questions, 
each with three possible answers.  First, has Congress authorized, remained neutral 
toward, or denied the President’s action?  Second, is the President’s action supported 
by an exclusively executive, an overlapping, or a legislative power?  Thus, nine 
possible results arise out of the Jackson framework.  Many of these results provide 












                                                                                                     
 178.  343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 179.  Id. at 584. 
 180.  AMANDA DIPAOLO, ZONES OF TWILIGHT: WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND 
FEDERAL COURT DECISION MAKING 21 (Lexington Books, 2010). 
 181.  Id.  
 182.  See generally Bobbitt, Youngstown, supra note 97 (discussing the rich, modal qualities of the 
various Youngstown opinions). 
 183.  Of course, this Article is primarily concerned with political branch perspectives on the 
separation of powers, while Justice Jackson obviously takes a judicial perspective. 
 184.  See, e.g., KOH, supra note 9, at 108-10 (noting Jackson’s “three-tiered hierarchy . . . now so 
familiar to first-year law students[,]” Jackson’s “three-part schema[,]” and Jackson’s “tripartite 
analysis”). 
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The President is 
at the “lowest 
ebb” and the act 
merits skeptical 
judicial review. 
The President is in 
the “zone of 
twilight” and the 
act merits fact-
intensive review. 










The President’s act 
is likely 
unconstitutional.185 
There is no issue as 
long as Congress has 
the necessary power. 
 
There are several important consequences of viewing Jackson’s framework as a 
nine-cell matrix rather than a three-category schema.  First, we see that separation of 
powers analysis branches out according to multiple initial inputs, and it will proceed 
on to more difficult constitutional questions only as the straightforward possibilities 
for resolution disappear.   
Second, we observe that the most demanding form of constitutional analysis is 
typically required only where powers overlap and Congress has either remained 
neutral toward or rejected the President’s action.  It is in these instances that 
interbranch constitutional process is either still ongoing or has broken down.  Neither 
text,186 nor history,187 have conclusively settled the issue.  Constitutional structure,188 
                                                                                                     
 185.  Justice Jackson, in a footnote, notes Lincoln’s suspension of habeas as an instance where the 
President made a contested claim to provisional powers in the face of judicial resistance and then 
received after-the-fact congressional approval.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 637 n.3 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  But Jackson is cautious here, and his later arguments 
suggest he does not agree with the argument I have defended—see supra text accompanying notes 120–
29 and 139–47—that the President may constitutionally exercise legislative power for a limited time 
during emergencies where congressional authorization is precluded. 
 186.  Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The actual art of governing under our Constitution does 
not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated 
clauses or even single Articles torn from context.”). 
 187.  Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have 
envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as 
the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.”). 
 188.  Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[The Constitution] enjoins upon its branches separateness 
but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, 
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.  We may well begin by… [the 
Justice Jackson framework.]”) (emphasis added). 
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therefore, drives the Court toward additional prudential,189 precedential,190 and 
ethical considerations,191 and their merits then guide the analysis forward to its 
conclusion.  We can distinguish between “lowest ebb” and “zone of twilight” 
analysis by noting that a presumption against the President’s arguments applies in 
the former instance,192 whereas prudential considerations—likely favoring the 
President—dominate the latter.193   
Third, we are reminded that this analytical framework for judicial review is only 
that.  Jackson’s concurrence describes a judicial methodology for sorting and 
evaluating the actions of the political branches that, even as an after-the-fact exercise, 
does not necessarily lead to conclusive constitutional answers by itself.  Jackson did 
not provide any sort of predetermined roadmap for executive-congressional relations 
and specifically admonished Congress with Napoleon’s maxim that “[t]he tools 
belong to the man who can use them.”194 
But Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, which is an exemplar of thoughtful 
judicial analysis, has often been mistaken for a guide to legislative action.  The 
mistaken takeaways from the Korean War—if viewed as an episode of sua sponte 
presidential aggrandizement with no underlying congressional or strategic causes—
and Youngstown—if viewed as a prescription for Congress to register expressive 
judgments on presidential action in anticipation of future judicial input—together led 
to a fundamental and problematic shift in how congressional war powers were 
viewed.195  The constitutive role of Congress was minimized, and the specificity and 
rigor of its ex ante decision-making about national security issues was similarly 
diminished.196  Instead, Congress began to act as a department that intermittently 
weighed in on the propriety of actions taken by the executive branch after the dust 
                                                                                                     
 189.  Id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[I] give to the enumerated powers the scope and elasticity 
afforded by what seem to be reasonable, practical implications instead of the rigidity dictated by a 
doctrinaire textualism.”). 
 190.  Id. at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Vast accretions of federal power, eroded from that 
reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential activity.  Subtle shifts take place in the 
centers of real power that do not show on the face of the Constitution.”). 
 191.  Id. at 644 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“That military powers of the Commander in Chief were not 
to supersede representative government of internal affairs seems obvious from the Constitution and from 
elementary American history.”). 
 192.  Id. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and 
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution.”). 
 193.  Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[A]ny actual test of power is likely to depend on the 
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”). 
 194.  Id. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 195.  A further mistake made with Youngstown is to interpret it as a case applying as forcefully to 
foreign affairs as it does to internal affairs.  Justice Jackson repeatedly emphasized the fact that 
Youngstown was about control over internal affairs.  Specifically, he noted that the Court: 
[S]hould indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain [the Commander in Chief’s] 
exclusive function to command the instruments of national force, at least when turned 
against the outside world for the security of our society.  But, when it is turned inward, not 
because of rebellion but because of a lawful economic struggle between industry and labor, 
it should have no such indulgence. 
Id. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 196.  Waxman, supra note 163 at 1626 (“At least by the Cold War, however, Presidents began 
exercising this power [to engage in hostilities] unilaterally in a much wider set of cases, and Congress 
mostly allowed them to do so.”).  
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had settled.197  Thus, as the nation emerged from the deeply divisive experiences of 
the Vietnam War and Nixon presidency just a few short decades after Youngstown, 
Congress passed an infamous statute that sought to reassert the legislature’s national 
security relevance by carving out an improper, quasi-judicial role for itself.198 
D. The War Powers Resolution 
In the waning months of 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution over 
President Nixon’s emphatic veto.199  The country was in the final stages of extricating 
itself from the Vietnam War, a conflict that had been extremely unpopular but 
consistently supported by congressional appropriations and authorizations.200   
Although the war eventually wound down in part due to congressional funding 
cutbacks,201 the legislature nonetheless emerged from the experience feeling that its 
existing institutional tools were insufficient.202  At first, the Senate and House were 
unable to find an approach to war powers reform that satisfied both bodies, and 
several bills preceding the WPR floundered and failed.203  The WPR Congress 
clashed over whether to adopt a bright-line, definitional approach—as the Senate 
preferred—or a procedural approach—as the House preferred.204   
In the end, the House approach won out.205  Nixon vetoed the resolution, 
criticizing the passive nature of its procedure for congressional termination of U.S. 
involvement in hostilities.206  Although some members of Congress accepted the 
President’s concerns,207 the bulk of the membership felt the WPR provided a healthy 
                                                                                                     
 197.  John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1379, 1379-80 (1988) (writing of congressional self-perception in the 1970s that, since 1950, “it had lain 
back, neither approving presidential military ventures nor very explicitly approving them, trusting the 
President to take the lead and waiting to see how the war in question played politically”). 
 198.  See, e.g., Robert F. Turner, The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still an Unconstitutional, 
Unnecessary, and Unwise Fraud that Contributed Directly to the 9/11 Attacks, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L 
L. 109, 116-19 (2012). 
 199.  Ely, supra note 197, at 1379. 
 200.  Id. at 1391 (noting that the Vietnam War “had been congressionally authorized—albeit not in 
the most responsibly way. . . .”). 
 201.  See Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis 
of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 485-88 (2011). 
 202.  See Ely, supra note 197, at 1380 (“[T]he War Powers Resolution is designed to force a decision 
regarding matters that Congress has in the past shown itself unwilling to face up to.”). 
 203.  See Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say Goodbye, 113 
POL. SCI. Q. 1, 2-3 (1998) (“In drafting the War Powers Resolution, the House and the Senate began 
with incompatible principles.”). 
 204.  See id. at 2; see also 119 CONG. REC. 24,655 (July 18, 1973) (statement of Rep. David Dennis) 
(“[W]hile ordinarily the President must have prior authorization to commit troops to combat abroad, I 
recognize that emergency situations may arise where that is not possible.  I do not attempt, as the Javits 
bill does in the [Senate], to define what those emergency situations may be. . . .”). 
 205.  Ely, supra note 197, at 1393. 
 206.  H.R. DOC. NO. 93-171, at 2 (1973) (“I am particularly disturbed by the fact that certain of the 
President’s constitutional powers . . . would terminate automatically . . . . [T]he Congress is here 
attempting to increase its policy-making role through a provision which requires it to take absolutely no 
action at all.”). 
 207.  119 CONG. REC. 36,204 (Nov. 7, 1973) (statement of Rep. Gerald R. Ford) (“We cannot deny 
that this bill does not really fashion a partnership.  It makes us, the Congress, a partner by inaction.  If 
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mix of flexibility for the President and ongoing oversight for Congress.208  
Congress correctly chose to focus on interbranch procedure in the WPR rather 
than detailing necessary and sufficient conditions for presidential action, but 
Congress nonetheless misconstrued its role in the constitutional process of national 
security.  The WPR is a brisk, ten section resolution that confidently states its 
purpose “to fill the intent of the framers of the Constitution.”209  Yet the resolution’s 
brevity papers over hundreds of years of constitutional debates, and the self-
conscious result attempts to recast Congress as an expressive, adjudicative body.210  
Section 2(c)—the clearest vestige of the Senate’s definitional approach—sets out a 
purportedly exhaustive description of the President’s Commander in Chief power211 
that fails to account for widely accepted uses.212  Section 3—on consultation between 
the President and Congress—is, although a laudable statutory goal, woefully 
underspecified and cannot be viewed as a serious attempt to increase interbranch 
deliberation despite the vague call for consultation “in every possible instance.”213   
Sections 4 and 5—the heart of the WPR—outline reporting requirements and 
specify procedures for the termination of U.S. involvement in hostilities.  Section 4 
requires the President to report to Congress within forty-eight hours when U.S. 
armed forces are introduced into a variety of circumstances.214  Then, Section 5(b)—
if reporting was made pursuant to Section 4(a)(1)—requires the President to 
withdraw armed forces from hostilities after sixty to ninety days unless Congress has 
specifically authorized the engagement.215  Meanwhile, Section 5(c) develops a 
concurrent resolution procedure for Congress to require the removal of U.S. forces 
at any time.216  Sections 6 and 7 create priority parliamentary procedures for 
resolutions arising out of the WPR.217  Finally, Section 8 states several rules of 
                                                                                                     
the Congress wants to assume a role that is essential for that partnership, we have to redesign this 
legislation.”). 
 208.  119 CONG. REC. 36,205 (Nov. 7, 1973) (statement of Rep. James Martin) (“[The WPR] allows 
quick, unencumbered Presidential response to crisis situations, but mandates congressional concurrence 
within a reasonable period of time.”). 
 209.  War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. 93-148, § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555, 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1541(a)). 
 210.  Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President under the War Powers 
Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 85 (1984) (describing the WPR as “a procedure by which Congress 
can express its institutional judgment on [presidential action]”). 
 211.  § 2(c), 87 Stat. at 555 (“[The President’s Commander in Chief powers] are exercised only 
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency 
created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”). 
 212.  See UNIV. OF VA. MILLER CTR OF PUB. AFFS., NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION REPORT 
21 (2008) (“[E]ven ardent advocates of congressional power recognize that Section 2(c) of the 
Resolution too narrowly defines the President’s war powers . . . .”). 
 213.  § 3, 87 Stat. at 555.  Despite the vague and minimal text in § 3 of the WPR, it has been 
relatively effective.  See Ely, supra note 197, at 1400-01.  I would argue that this is because § 3—almost 
uniquely in the WPR—correctly understands Congress’s proper role. 
 214.  § 4(a), 87 Stat. at 555-56. 
 215.  Id. § 5(b), 87 Stat. at 556 (extending the withdrawal clock from 60 to 90 days “if the President 
determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the 
safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces”). 
 216.  Id. § 5(c), 87 Stat. at 556-57 (“[F]orces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so 
directs by concurrent resolution.”). 
 217.  Id. §§ 6, 7, 87 Stat. at 557-58. 
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interpretation for the statute, including a bar against inferring congressional 
authorization from implied sources—such as appropriations.218  
The WPR has been consistently panned as an unconstitutional infringement on 
the President’s war powers.  First, Section 2(c) does not recognize the President’s 
authority to protect American people or property abroad, and it is separated by a vast 
chasm from the theory of presidential power embraced by modern presidents, which 
extends to “important national interest[s] protected by means short of war.”219  
Second, the automatic withdrawal provision in Section 5(b) has been consistently 
contested by presidential administrations, and presidents almost never report under 
Section 4(a)(1), which is the only section that triggers 5(b) automatic withdrawal.220  
Third, the concurrent resolution provision in Section 5(c) is likely an unconstitutional 
legislative veto after INS v. Chadha.221  Fourth, the restriction against inferring 
authorization for the President from congressional appropriations is an undemocratic 
limit on the lawmaking options available to future Congresses.222  Even those more 
sympathetic to the style of the WPR have criticized the resolution for being overfitted 
to the political climate of the early 1970s,223 failing to foresee technological and 
strategic change,224 and relying on ambiguous language at key points.225 
But the fundamental failure of the WPR is that Congress abandoned its 
constitutive national security powers.  Instead, Congress’s WPR reimagines the 
Declare War power as an on-off switch—or at least a dimmer switch—that can be 
subtly manipulated through restrictive canons of interpretation, automatic 
withdrawal clocks, and congressional statements lacking the force of law.  This view 
of Congress’s role is blind to history, the constitutional process of national security, 
                                                                                                     
 218.  Id. § 8(a)(1), 87 Stat. at 558 (“[Authorization is not to be inferred from] any provision 
contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes . . . .”). 
 219.  See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 20 27-33 (2011). 
 220.  See CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42699, The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice 6 (2019) 
(“Every President . . . has taken the position that [the WPR] is an unconstitutional infringement on the 
President’s authority as Commander in Chief.”); id. at 10 (“The report on the Mayaguez recapture was 
the only War Powers report to date to specifically cite Section 4(a)(1), but the question of the time limit 
was moot because the action was over by the time the report was filed.”). 
 221.  Id. at 7-8 (noting the passage of 50 U.S.C. § 1546a – a “free standing” post-Chadha revision to 
the WPR process that “fill[s] the gap left by the possible invalidity of the concurrent resolution 
mechanism”).  See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 222.  Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 Op. O.L.C. 327, 341 (2000) (recounting 
the long history of congressional appropriations operating as authorization and adopting and crediting 
Philip Bobbitt’s argument that “if one Congress could bind subsequent Congresses in this way, it would 
effectively enshrine itself in defiance of [an] electoral mandate” (quoting Bobbitt, War Powers, supra 
note 39, at 1399)). 
 223.  See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Too Far Apart: Repeal the War Powers Resolution, 50 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 17, 18-21 (1995) (“The Resolution emerged from an aberrational political climate in 1973, and 
that climate was wrongly assumed to represent a sea-change in congressional-executive relations that 
would exist for years to come.”). 
 224.  See, e.g., Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 201, at 449 (“[T]he War Powers Resolution, 
passed in the wake of Vietnam, continues to suppose that wars come in only two sizes . . . [and it] failed 
to acknowledge that modem war is limited war.”).  This reflects the weakness of any overfitted view of 
national security and the separation of powers, whether that view is embedded in constitutional or 
statutory text.  War changes, and so too must law. 
 225.  See, e.g., Vance, supra note 210, at 91-94 (proposing amendments to shore up the WPR’s loose 
statutory language). 
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and contemporary strategic pressures.  Predictably, the WPR has failed to lead to 
meaningful congressional involvement or more cooperative and open presidential 
decision-making.  The WPR, and the other 20th century events discussed, do not tell 
us that Congress must transform itself in order to fight back against a runaway 
presidency that has trampled Congress and seized unmerited and unconstitutional 
power.  Instead, the experience of the 20th century shows us that developments in 
the nation’s geostrategy and national interests require the political branches to renew 
their mutual investment in affirmative, deliberative modes of collaboration on 
national security issues. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This path through centuries of constitutional history is one of many routes 
through the thicket.  Although I hope that my commitment to methodology has led 
me true, I am sure that a summary of my conclusions about the Constitution’s 
approach to national security will help the reader correct me if—where—I have gone 
astray.  So, the Constitution provides a rough silhouette of the relationship between 
legislative and executive national security powers, but it leaves the detail to be filled 
in by ongoing interbranch process.226  Detail was left unfinished not because the 
Founders lacked strategic insight—the Constitution was confidently endowed with a 
particular geostrategy well-suited for its day—but because they had the foresight to 
realize the nation’s legal order required sufficient flexibility to address future 
strategic developments.   
Therefore, while core textual powers structure and limit the flow of 
constitutional process, text alone cannot fully categorize the set of applicable rules 
or allow one to predict the constitutional calibrations that will occur in a given 
situation.  Bearing this in mind, the value gained from carefully analyzing past 
experience and practice is substantial.227  The precedents of history are loaded with 
elaborations—at once legal and strategic—that shed light on the fundamental rules 
governing the constitutional process of national security calibration.228  
At bedrock, we are consistently reminded that this constitutional process is how 
America keeps law alive in those stressful circumstances where the nation is 
threatened and democracy flickers.  In these moments, we must defend either a 
constitutional system that allows for boundary-pushing theories of executive power 
                                                                                                     
 226.  The existence of the process itself derives from:  (1) text, the actual language that vests powers 
with Congress and the President, (2) history, the Founders’ deep concern for well-calibrated geostrategy 
and national security policy, and (3) structure, the at times open-ended and at times overlapping nature 
of legislative and executive prerogatives. 
 227.  See generally NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014).  Five members of the court, citing 
Justice Marshall in McCulloch and Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown, emphasized that practice was an 
important interpretative factor for settling questions about “the allocation of power between two elected 
branches of Government” even if the practice was “subject to dispute” and “began after the founding 
era.”  Id. at 524-26.  Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment with the last three Justices, agreed only if 
the Court was dealing with “an ambiguous constitutional provision” and the practice was “open, 
widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic.”  Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 228.  The rules of the process—bounded first by text, history, and structure—accrue additional detail 
from:  (1) prudence, the efficiency and necessity of various templates for executive action, (2) ethos, the 
conscious renewal of the Founders’ pairing of law and strategy, and (3) doctrine, the sedimentation of 
political branch practice, at times informed by judicial review. 
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that afford Congress an opportunity to later respond,229 or a constitutional system 
that demands illegal executive action that may or may not be ratified ex post by 
Congress.230   
There is reason to be cautious about the precedent set by either, but I firmly 
support the former.  The Constitution, and the nation, are better served by presidents 
who feel compelled to make careful constitutional arguments while wary of 
congressional rebuttal than they are by presidents who violate the law in the hopes 
of later finding 218 + 51 votes to ratify the action.  We should, therefore, not attempt 
to invent a frozen analysis of war powers or a rigid separation of powers “settled” by 
falsely determinative constitutional text and history.231  This rigidity would demand, 
and therefore normalize, presidential action that ignores so-called constitutional 
mandates.  In contrast, the principled evolution of our Constitution to match the 
developments of the world is a triumph—not a defeat—of the rule of law. 
On a closely related note, we repeatedly see that the process requires cooperative 
action to function properly—a rule that is both implied by the Constitution and 
impossible to miss in practice.  Thus, cooperation between the political branches is 
not just a description of past experience—it is a normative dictate that every 
participant must respect today.  This foundational rule takes on a more specific form 
for each branch.  The President must always operate pursuant to open and honest 
policies even if, from time to time, he must act unilaterally or in secret.232  Congress 
must act with conviction even if it could stand back instead, and the body must 
respect that it is a participant in—not an adjudicator of—national security decision-
making.233  And, finally, the courts must establish incentives for good political 
branch behavior rather than abstain from judgment or endorse doctrines that might 
stunt cooperation in the future.234  It is these basic prescriptions that preserve and 
                                                                                                     
 229.  See supra notes 120–29 and 139–47 and accompanying text. 
 230.  See, e.g., FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, supra note 35, at 87 (“In a genuine emergency, 
a President may act without congressional authority (and without express legal or constitutional 
authority), trusting that the circumstances are so urgent and compelling that Congress will endorse his 
actions and confer a legitimacy that only Congress, as the people’s representative, can provide.”).  
 231.  Contra Fisher & Adler, supra note 203, at 9 (“The meaning of the war clause was thus settled 
at the dawn of the republic. . . . The Constitution grants to Congress the sum total of the nation’s power 
to commence hostilities.  There was in the Convention no doubt about the limited scope of the 
president’s war power.”). 
 232.  See Philip Bobbitt, Inter Arma Enim Non Silent Legis, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 253, 260-61 
(2012) (“The rule of law is the civilian’s best bulwark not only against his own government but against 
those who would hold him hostage to their political objectives by threatening him with violence. . . . 
This feature of contemporary warfare imposes on governments a necessity to make the legal arguments 
for their operations.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for 
long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made 
by parliamentary deliberations.”). 
 233.  See Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 201, at 495-96 (“We have come a long way from the 
Founding Era, when the president was obliged to gain fine-grained funding from Congress before he 
could engage in significant military action.  Nowadays, Congress is playing catch-up.”); Youngstown, 
359 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep 
power in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems.  A crisis that 
challenges the President equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges Congress.”).  
 234.  See KOH, supra note 9, at 184 (“[T]he role of judges is to define the rule of law by drawing the 
line between illegitimate exercises of political power and legitimate exercises of legal authority.”); 
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renew the vitality of the Constitution. 
Yet, one wonders if these rules—and this process—will continue to be enough.  
As America has ventured out from the safe harbor of its original national security 
paradigm, it has become increasingly difficult to generate presidential and 
congressional roles that map sensibly onto modern security aims.  In today’s world, 
the combined complexity, scale, and stakes of national security threaten to 
overwhelm the ordered discipline of constitutional law.  There are many causes of 
this strategic upheaval, but several stand out.   
First, civilians can be targeted at scale in a multitude of different ways.235  
Second, destructive—even catastrophic—power is widely distributed among states, 
non-state organizations, and even individuals.236  Third, it is increasingly difficult to 
confidently determine the perpetrator of an attack, whether that attack be cyber, 
biological, or otherwise.237  Fourth, the world is interconnected to such a degree that 
traditional geographic barriers are essentially porous or irrelevant.238  We now travel 
the cliffside path, balancing our need to prevent civilian carnage with our need for 
open democratic governance.239  At our heels come the dogs of war, of pandemic, of 
disabled power grids, of nuclear weaponry in a suitcase.  Below us lays the plunge 
into lawlessness, into total surveillance, into suspicion, into the siren that never 
ceases to screech. 
The constitutional process—for all its flexibility and enduring vitality—was 
designed to work best on an intermediate time horizon, where the political branches 
had an opportunity to jointly consider constitutive and directory responses to a 
particular threat.  But, given the nature of modern vulnerabilities and the need for 
preclusive government action, the timing of national security interventions has 
necessarily morphed into a bimodal distribution.   
At one end, Congress’s constitutive powers must be exercised well in advance 
                                                                                                     
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Such institutions [of rule by parliamentary law] 
may be destined to pass away.  But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.”). 
 235.  GLOBAL TRENDS: PARADOX OF PROGRESS, NAT’L INTEL. COUNCIL 20 (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf  [https://perma.cc/E9M4-62RQ ] (“Future 
conflicts will increasingly emphasize the disruption of critical infrastructure, societal cohesion, and 
basic government functions . . . Noncombatants will be increasingly targeted.”). 
 236.  Id. at 20-21 (“The threat posed by nuclear and other forms of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) probably will increase in the years ahead due to technology advances and growing asymmetry 
between forces. . . . The proliferation of advanced technologies, especially biotechnologies, will also 
lower the threshold for new actors to acquire WMD capabilities.”). 
 237.  Id. at 216 (“[N]ew means for conducting conflicts and sowing instability . . . will often 
obfuscate the source of attacks impeding effective responses.”). 
 238.  Id. at 25 (“Increasing global connectivity and changing environmental conditions will affect the 
geographic distribution of pathogens and their hosts, and, in turn, the emergence, transmission, and 
spread of many human and animal infectious diseases.”); LUCAS KELLO, THE VIRTUAL WEAPON & THE 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 6 (2017) (“States and other actors use cyberspace to penetrate each other’s 
most basic infrastructures. . . . [I]n the past, the enemy’s presence in essential domestic terrains signaled 
the failure of security policy; today it is a starting axiom.”). 
 239.  See BOBBITT, TERROR & CONSENT, supra note 3, at 137-38 (“One way to articulate this change 
is to say that developments have increased the role of preclusion in warfare. . . . The war aim is to 
protect civilians and their officials so that, behind this military shield, the political development of 
governance based on consent can take place . . . .”). 
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of any particular threat arising—there is no time to wait.240  At the other end, the 
President’s directory powers must be exercised at the drop of a hat, springing into 
action without studied and open deliberation—there is no time to wait.241  This 
temporal and epistemic divergence in political branch action is a significant 
development, and it poses a substantial challenge to our constitutional order.  Even 
worse, while the Founders were uniquely talented constitutional architects, we must 
admit that our modern leaders are often something less than that. 
But rather than closing on a defeatist note, I will offer some suggestions 
grounded in the lessons of past practice for how the constitutional process might yet 
rise to the challenge of today’s national security landscape.  Most importantly, the 
fundamental ground rules previously discussed—of honest, collaborative, and 
strategy-sensitive deliberation between the political branches—must be followed.  
Beyond that, the various government departments must undertake a serious effort to 
reach out across the gap created by the now disparate timing of their core national 
security interventions.   
The President, and the President’s vast assembly of lawyers, should create and 
publish proactive guidance on how the executive branch will use particular 
capabilities and respond to different emergency archetypes.242  Some of this work 
would be fit for mass publication, some of it would be classified and provided to 
appropriate congressional committees, and some of it would—at the least—be 
created for internal use with a plan for broader release when possible.  This practice 
would shift difficult questions about presidential directory power toward more 
public, proactive debates, even if the actual use of that power will frequently continue 
to be secret, sudden, or reactive.  
Congress should strive to exercise its constitutive powers with as much 
specificity and foresight as possible and then rapidly revise its approach, as needed, 
when exigency strikes.243  This does not mean the body should undersupply national 
security tools or attempt to require that the President refer back to Congress before 
using capabilities the legislature developed.  Rather, it means that presidential power 
should operate in the shadow of ongoing statutory authorizations, and that Congress 
should consult on and openly deliberate about presidential execution of the laws.244  
                                                                                                     
 240.  See KENT & MORTENSON, supra note 4, at 283 (“[L]egislative authorization has now become 
so comprehensive and open-ended that, while presidential aggrandizement has certainly continued, it 
has more typically done so through assertion of statutory authority.”). 
 241.  See Stromseth, supra note 172, at 890 (“[I]t is hard to imagine that [the Founders] would not 
have expected the President as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to protect the country from 
serious external threats in emergency situations . . . . The nature of modern military technology, which 
confronts us with threats incomparable in their speed and destructive power to those faced in 1789, only 
reinforces such an understanding.”). 
 242.  Democratic accountability is not necessarily eroded by a shift of practical war power from 
Congress to the President as long as citizens still know what the nation is doing.  But, the potential for 
democratic breakdown is greater as the President’s role increases because Congress must act through 
public laws and the President may act through classified orders and legal opinions. 
 243.  This is one of those sentences that deserves a book-length footnote.  For now, I refer the reader 
to Philip Bobbitt’s preliminary proposals for a proactive approach to national security, many of them 
statutory.  See BOBBITT, TERROR & CONSENT, supra note 3, at 412-26. 
 244.  If theses about the eclipse of legality by politicization are correct, then this will pose its own 
difficulties.  See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2311 (2006) (writing that “[f]ew aspects of the founding generation’s political 
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Thoughtful congressional authorization—much more so than inaction or retroactive 
disapproval—promotes security, imposes limits, and fosters legitimacy.245  
Expanded presidential power and robust constraints on the use of that power, when 
both are supplied by an active legislature, can be mutually reinforcing features of the 
modern presidency.246   
Finally, the courts would be greatly empowered by the additional legal and 
statutory products contemplated by these recommendations.  Judges would have the 
underlying material to more confidently forgo the political question doctrine, and 
courts could settle debates first by considering whether the President and Congress 
had developed rules for the situation now at hand and, then, by the strength of what 
the political branches prepared.  This increased judicial involvement would 
complement a trend already developing, where courts—sensing the complex nature 
of modern war and the need for law to apply—have begun to move away from 
categorical, formalist approaches to foreign affairs and national security cases.247  
There is much more to add to these suggestions.  Yet I hope this Article—by 
identifying and developing certain important themes of the constitutional process 
that shapes America’s national security—has made a small contribution that might 
prove worthwhile. 
  
                                                                                                     
theory are now more clearly anachronistic than their vision of legislative-executive separation of 
powers. . . . The practical distinction between party-divided and party-unified government thus rivals, 
and often dominates, the constitutional distinction between the branches.”).  But polarized party politics 
is a problem at once greater and meaner than the scope of this Article, and I will not yet accept it is an 
axiom of constitutional analysis.  
 245.  In addition to Bobbitt’s suggestions, supra note 243, I refer the reader to Harold Koh’s 
guidelines for national security law reform.  See KOH, supra note 9, at 161-84.  Koh is more skeptical of 
the executive branch, and his proposals reflect this skepticism.  Yet, regardless of one’s level of 
skepticism, many of his suggestions are wisely and appropriately designed to encourage interbranch 
dialogue, congressional activity, and public deliberation.  
 246.  See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER & CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY 
AFTER 9/11 (2012) (describing how the expansion of executive national security powers can be—and 
has been—paired with additional oversight and monitoring by a multitude of internal and external 
actors). 
 247.  See generally Andrew Kent, Disappearing Legal Black Holes & Converging Domains: 
Changing Individual Rights Prots. in National Security & Foreign Affairs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 
1032-33 (2015) (explaining that individual rights in national security and foreign affairs had been based 
on “categorical rules and boundary-drawing” but now “previously distinct boundaries are softening and 
previously distinct spheres are becoming more alike”). 
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